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Summary 
 While Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) have existed for nearly six decades, only in the last decade, 
because of their rapid increase in size and activities, have they attracted the attention of policy makers.  The IMF has 
identified five types of funds based on their main objective: 1  1) stabilization funds, 2) savings funds, 3) reserve 
investment corporations, 4) development funds, and 5) pension reserve funds.   While these functions are typically 
and purposefully separated in unique free standing legal entities, many countries’ funds may have single or multiple 
functions with ambiguous missions and ambiguous lines of authority.  Kazakhstan has two that play a critical role in 
the economy. The National Fund for the Future of Kazakhstan (NOF, the “national oil fund”) serves as a 
stabilization fund and a savings fund.   Samruk Kazyna (SK, the “sovereign welfare fund”), a government owned 
holding company, acts as a development fund focusing on economic development objectives of the government.  
The National Bank of Kazakhstan (NBK) also manages the foreign exchange reserves as a separate fund in the 
Bank.   
 This paper identifies the major concerns associated with SWFs, mainly revolving around state ownership 
and lack of transparency. These include 1) commercial advantages that private companies do not enjoy, 2) SWF 
objectives that may reflect government foreign policy objectives, 3) activities which may disrupt global or 
individual country capital markets, 4) ownership in particular industries as a vehicle for the transfer of sensitive 
technologies, and 5) coordinated actions of a group of SWFs that may lead to global control of particular resources.  
 Most SWFs convert natural resource wealth into more “spendable” financial assets.  Access to financial 
resources enables the acceleration of development programs, but also may enable the continuation of undesirable 
macroeconomic policies.  Market discipline may be lost and economic policy decisions may be highly politicized.  
Many SWFs lack clarity in their organizational structure, have ill defined governance mechanisms, lack 
accountability and transparency and suffer from poorly designed or non-existent financial management policies. The 
lack of independent auditors or published annual reports and opaque balance sheets leaves room for questionable 
behavior.  Critics claim that they are a major source of graft and corruption. These concerns can be addressed if the 
SWFs individually provide greater transparency in their strategy and objectives, management and accounting 
practices and individual transactions. The IMF Working Group on Sovereign Wealth Funds has proposed a set of 
“best practice” guidelines, The Santiago Prinicples, for the activities of SWFs. To date Kazakhstan is not a 
signatory, however. 
 The NOF is not a legal entity, but instead a fund at the NBK established by Presidential decree, owned by 
the Ministry of Finance, overseen by a Management Council appointed by the President and managed by the 
Treasury Department of the NBK.  The Council sets governance and investment policies and the portfolio is 
managed by the NBK.  Receipts consist of direct budget transfers (the initial endowment), direct taxes other oil 
sector receipts, revenues from privatization and sales of land, and investment income.  Assets have grown steadily 
from just over US$8 billion in 2005 to US$41.6 billion in 2010.  Uses of funds are: 1) “guaranteed transfers” to the 
government, which grew from US$2.1 billion in 2002 to US$8.1 billion in 2010, now limited by the “New Concept” 
to about US$8 billion annually, 2) “targeted transfers,” direct transfers to SK in response to the financial crisis in 
2008 and 2009, and 3) management expenses.  The NOF has accumulated assets every year since its inception, with 
taxes from production sharing and royalties accounting for about two thirds of revenues, oil and gas lease payments 
accounting for another 20% and excess profits taxes and corporate income taxes accounting for about 9%. 
The NOF is designed to provide economic stability and savings for future generations.  There are three 
distinct portfolios or funds within the NOF, each with unique investment criteria:  a dollar denominated stability 
fund and savings fund, both managed by the NBK, and a smaller tenge denominated fund managed by the Ministry 
                                                            
1 IMF (2008). “Sovereign Wealth Funds—A Work Agenda,” February 29, 2008, available at 
 http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2008/022908.pdf 
3 
 
of Finance.  Investment guidelines for the Stability Fund require high liquidity with the 6 month US T-bill as 
benchmark, and US$ as base currency.  The Savings Fund as of February 2011, consists of 20% equities, 80% fixed 
income investments.  Managers appear conservative and were less affected by the global financial crisis; overall 
performance was -2.5% vs -23% (or so) for the Norwegian SWF.  The fixed income portfolio is managed by the 
Treasury Department staff.  The equities portfolio is still externally managed.    External managers are selected on 
the basis of historic results, experience, stability of the management team, fee levels and credit worthiness.  
Presently there are no investments in private capital, but discussions with the management council will begin this 
year.  Investment grade corporate and emerging market global bonds will be added to the bond portfolio and the 
share of the equity portfolio managed internally will be increased. The NOF produces quarterly reports that are 
approved by the Management Council, the Ministry of Finance and the government administration.  These are not 
published, but may be excerpted in the Annual Report of the NBK.  Thus, transparency remains an issue. 
 The Sovereign Wealth Fund Samruk Kazyna, a joint stock company with the Ministry of Finance as the 
sole shareholder, is much larger and more important than the NOF. The assets of SK are estimated to be from 50-
80% of GDP, and revenues of the companies around 20-30% of total GDP, perhaps higher.  SK was created by 
merging two existing Joint Stock Companies, JSC Kazakhstan Holding for the Management of State Assets Samruk 
and JSC Kazyna Sustainable Development Fund, under the guidance of the State Property and Privatization 
Committee of the Ministry of Finance. Samruk was a holding company of the five large state monopolies, 
KazTelecom, KazRail, Kazmunigas, KazPost and KeGok.   Kazyna consisted mainly of regional Social-
Entrepreneurship Companies focused on economic development, many initially funded with resources from the 
NOF.  Entities held by SK, range from Air Astana, to real estate ventures and newly acquired commercial banks.  
Many of these companies have multiple subsidiaries so the total number of companies held is difficult to estimate.  
Recently ownership of several of the companies was transferred from SK to other Ministries.  
 Recent transactions with Samruk Kazyna are seen as one-time events.  About $5 billion in SK bonds were 
purchased by the NOF and there was a $5 billion direct transfer from the NOF to SK.  The direct transfer came in 
part from the tenge “Domestic” Account of the NOF managed by the Ministry of Finance and $2-3 billion from the 
Stability Fund of the NOF. The “New Concept” for the NOF now emphasizes the savings function, increasing until 
2020 with a goal of approximately 30% of GDP.   
The use of the resources of the NOF and transactions with SK during the global crisis illustrates how 
closely the government administration, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economic Development and 
Trade, the NOF, and SK are intertwined. SK will serve as the primary means of achieving the 2020 Strategic Plan.  
Companies held by SK are called on to implement about half (in number and value) of the projects for accelerated 
industrialization and innovation.  Presently it is unlikely that NOF resources will be called upon to support these 
efforts, but both political discipline and economic circumstances remain determining factors. 
 Critical issues regarding SK range from corporate governance and transparency, to ownership rights and 
claims on these assets and the income they produce, to the legitimate roles of the state in directing economic 
development.  The (draft) March/April government’s strategic plan identifies three broad objectives for SK.  First, it 
must play a leading role in the diversification of the economy, second, it must increase the efficiency and 
performance of companies it holds, and third the government will finalize and then lessen SKs role in the anti-crisis 
measures. 
 With regard to policy there are both institutional and longer term policy issues that should be resolved.  It is 
clear that the institutional structure of the economy is still evolving.  Samruk-Kazyna’s influence on the economy is 
too large and the tolerance for less than optimal economic performance and lack of competition distorts the 
competitive allocation of resources away from their highest and best use.  Policies to promote and assist in the 
privatization of commercially viable entities and the dissolution of non-viable entities should be clearly supported.  
These should first include efforts to increase transparency in accounting and governance of the operations of both 
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Samruk-Kayna and the individual entities it holds.  Then, specific programs of privatization should be encouraged, 
from voucher systems to distribute ownership to tax payers at large, to initial public offerings, to sale to foreign 
entities. In each case the disposition of revenues from privatization should be clearly articulated and monitored.  
These range from shares or direct payments to taxpayers, as in many East European countries, contributions or 
transfers to the pension system, as in Norway, direct flows to the government budget, as in Hungary, or 
contributions to the National Oil Fund to lessen the immediate macroeconomic impact.  While it is clear that 
Samruk-Kazyna, the National Oil Fund and the government’s development program are closely entwined, 
projections of growth in NOF assets do not appear to be explicitly linked to the volume of oil or natural resource 
exports, world demand or prices of these exports.  Revenues of the National Oil Fund are best seen as a residual, that 
amount of net foreign inflows remaining after non-inflationary government and development expenditures are made.  
Given inflation appears persistently high the amount of foreign revenues hitting the domestic economy is apparently 
too large and should be reduced.  The links between domestic development needs, performance of the global 
economy and growth in assets of the NOF should be clearly delineated in policy discussions, then monitored and 
managed within the context of domestic macroeconomic policy objectives and global economic performance. 
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I. Introduction 
 The first sovereign wealth fund, now called the Kuwait Investment Authority, was 
founded in 1953 with little notice. In the last decade however, the number of sovereign wealth 
funds and the assets under management have grown to such an extent that they may be considered 
a “systemic” concern.  Kazakhstan, following the lead of most resource based economies, created 
the National Oil Fund in 2000.  This entity has no legal standing but is simply a government-
owned fund at the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and is funded primarily through 
the various taxes and royalties on oil production.  A second entity, Samruk Kazyna, was created 
in 2008 as a joint stock company with a single shareholder, the Kazakhstan government, with the 
Ministry of Finance as founding body. This entity also meets the definition of a sovereign wealth 
fund.  Both have proven to be of critical importance to the Kazakhstan economy and the 
management of the recent financial crisis. 
 Despite their size and importance there is virtually no discussion of these two sovereign 
wealth funds in the economics, legal studies or political science or law literature on sovereign 
wealth funds – perhaps a mention of the National Oil Fund in general studies of sovereign wealth 
funds, but nothing on Samruk Kazyna.  There is virtually no description, analysis, or evaluation of 
their activities and performance.  In fact, while there is now a substantial literature on the general 
nature of sovereign wealth funds, it lacks specificity in part because the data is sketchy and 
difficult to compare from fund to fund.  The issues concerning sovereign wealth funds, from 
corporate governance and transparency to investment policies and implications, are very 
contentious and many are unresolved.   
 This paper provides an initial examination of the National Oil Fund and Samruk Kazyna. 
The next section provides a brief review of issues and concerns relating to sovereign wealth funds 
in general.  Section III then discusses the National Oil Fund and Samruk Kazyna in particular.  
For readers well versed in the issues regarding sovereign wealth funds section II may be skipped.   
II .  Setting the Stage:  Overview of Sovereign Wealth Funds – Definitions, Issues and  
 Concerns2 
Defining Sovereign Funds 
 “Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) are pools of assets owned and managed directly or 
indirectly by governments to achieve national objectives.” 3  Typically they are funded by foreign 
                                                            
2  Truman (2007, 2008, 2010), inter alia, provide very comprehensive descriptions and analyses of sovereign wealth 
funds.  This section provides only a brief overview of the essentials.  
3 Blundell-Wignall, Hu and Yermo (2008). A more elaborate definition, by the International Working Group on 
Sovereign Wealth Funds is:  SWFs are defined as special purpose investment funds or arrangements, owned by the 
general government. Created by the general government for macroeconomic purposes, SWFs hold, manage, or 
administer assets to achieve financial objectives, and employ a set of investment strategies which include investing in 
foreign financial assets. The SWFs are commonly established out of balance of payments surpluses, official foreign 
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exchange reserves, royalties on the sale of natural resources, or general tax revenues.  The IMF 
has identified five types of funds based on their main objective: 4  1) stabilization funds, designed 
to insulate the national budget and domestic economy from commodity price swings, usually oil, 
2) savings funds, designed to realize and convert natural resource wealth into more diversified 
assets for future generations and mitigate the effects of Dutch disease, 3) reserve investment 
corporations, designed to increase the return on foreign reserve assets (which otherwise are 
typically invested in very short term assets to be available for currency exchange rate 
management purposes), 4) development funds, designed to support socio-economic projects,  
promote industrial policies or overall development objectives, and  5)  pension reserve funds, 
which fund national pension systems (from sources independent of individual contributions) or 
provide for unspecified contingent liabilities.5 The funds often have multiple, overlapping and 
evolving objectives.  In addition, their purpose has often been broadened.  E.g., as a result of the 
financial crisis these funds have been tapped to stabilize the economy or recapitalize the banking 
and financial systems.  In Kazakhstan four banks, several construction/real estate ventures and a 
major agricultural enterprise were fully or partially nationalized and/or recapitalized (the 
operations resulted in a transfer of funds of about US$5 billion in 2008, US$1.8 billion in 2009 
and the purchase of about US$4 billion in Samruk Kazyna bonds by the National Oil Fund).   
Size6 
 Regardless of the origin of their revenues or their specific purpose SWFs have become 
large enough to be systemically important.  Truman (2010) estimates total assets of sovereign 
wealth funds to be about US$3.5 trillion, excluding pension funds, or US$5.9 trillion including 
those designated as pension funds (e.g., Japan, Norway and others).  And, of those assets, US$3.7 
trillion are foreign assets.7  Tables 1 and 2 (all tables referred to in this section are in Appendix 1), 
from Beck and Fidora (2008), provide data on the largest SWFs and the largest cross border 
transactions in 2007-2008. They estimate the total assets of these SWFs to be about US$5 trillion.  
Several independent estimates suggest total assets of SWFs were growing at about US$1 trillion 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
currency operations, the proceeds of privatizations, fiscal surpluses, and/or receipts resulting from commodity 
exports. IWG (2008) 
4 IMF (2008). 
5 For the most part, funds which strictly finance national pension systems, Public Pension Reserve Funds (PPRFs) 
like Social Security Reserve Funds (SSRFs) funded by contributions in excess of current payouts, such as the US 
Social Security Trust Fund, or Sovereign Pension Reserve Funds (SPRFs) like the Australian Future Fund, funded by 
direct government transfers, are not of concern in this paper even though they are often  referred to as SWFs. Kimmitt 
(2008) offers a simpler categorization of sovereign investment:  international reserves, public pension funds, state-
owned enterprises, and SWFs which may be further disaggregated by source of funds, resource revenues, balance of 
payments surpluses, etc.. 
6   It is very difficult to construct comparative data for the SWFs.  Reporting is voluntary, there are no uniform 
reporting standards, and different authors have compiled data at different points in time, for different measures of 
assets and  in different currencies (or in US$ at different exchange rates).  Truman (various) and Beck and 
Fidora(2008) appear to have the most consistent measures, but at different points in time, mostly prior to the global 
financial crisis. Even though these may be considered the best estimates, they often do not agree. 
7  Truman (2010) Table 2.1, pp. 12-15. Note though that most data mentioned here are estimates.  Many sovereign 
wealth funds do not reveal the size of the fund. 
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per year prior to the global financial crisis and would have easily reached the US$10-15 trillion 
range by 2015 on that trajectory.  Post-crisis estimates, taking into account substantial losses or 
expenditures from the funds, are much less, in the US$5 trillion to US$10 trillion range. Table 3a 
compiled by the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute estimates SWF total assets to be about US$4.7 
trillion in 2011.  The first sovereign wealth fund was the Kuwait Investment Agency originally 
founded as the Kuwait Investment Office in London in 1953, before Kuwait was a sovereign 
country.  In 2011 the Kuwait Investment Agency had US$296 billion in assets.  The largest SWF, 
however, is the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, with an estimated US$627 billion under 
management.  SWF assets of Gulf Cooperation Council8  countries are estimated at US$1.5 
trillion, nearly half the world wide total.9  Note though that many SWFs do not report their assets 
at all and throughout the discussion we can only discuss estimates and these vary significantly, 
sometimes as much as 500%. Further, while many do not report their assets often they report 
virtually nothing about their organization.  As indicated in Table 3a the two most common 
measures of transparency, the Linaburg-Maduell transparency index (LMTI) and the Truman 
score (TS), vary considerably across funds and frequently do not agree.  For example Bahrain’s 
fund has an LMTI of 9 (out of a possible 10) and a TS of 30 (out of a possible 100).  
(Transparency issues are discussed further below). 
  Kimmitt ( 2008) provides some perspective by noting relative to other types of 
participants in the financial markets that SWF assets are small compared to total global assets of 
about US$190 trillion, hedge fund assets of about US$1.5 trillion and pension funds and 
endowments of US$53 trillion (all in 2008).  But the number of individual hedge funds and 
pension funds is much, much larger than the number of SWFs and the concentration of assets in a 
handful of SWFs is much greater.  It is doubtful that any one hedge fund or pension fund could 
substantially and permanently move a market.  For SWFs it is not so clear. More recent data 
comparing SWF assets and stock and bond market capitalizations are reported in Tables 3b, 3c 
and 3d.  The largest SWF, Abu Dhabi, the National Fund of Kazakhstan and the average of the 10 
largest SWFs relative to the world total stock market capitalization and the stock market 
capitalization of 29 countries is reported.  While the assets of the Abu Dhabi fund are small 
compared to the major stock markets (and the Kazakhstan Fund even smaller) they amount to 
nearly 20% of the capitalization of the Italian stock market and 63% of the Finnish stock market. 
The assets of the Abu Dhabi fund relative to various measures of debt are much larger.  E.g., Abu 
Dhabi SWF assets are about 2.5% of total US debt issued, 20% of Italian debt issued and 228% of 
Greek debt issued.  It is clear that SWFs could be significant players – able to move markets – in 
selected equity and debt markets.   It is also clear that the global financial order is undergoing a 
radical restructuring (even before the global financial crisis) and Lee (2009) argues that in fact 
                                                            
8  More formally the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, which consists of the Arab monarchies of 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Jordan, Morocco and Yemen are in 
varying stages of discussion with respect to membership. 
9   Winder (2010). 
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there is a reversal of neo-colonialism, with capital-dependent developed economies falling prey to 
newly rich, capital abundant resource based economies.10  
Should we be concerned? --  State ownership and lack of transparency 
 Underlying the U.S. economy is free enterprise and the efficiency of markets in allocating 
goods, services and factor inputs, including capital.  The belief that markets can allocate resources 
more efficiently than governments is rarely debated.  By endowing states with the financial power 
embodied in sovereign wealth funds, these foreign governments then have the power to reduce 
free enterprise or bypass the competitive allocation of resources to their best uses.  Thus, the most 
basic assumptions about the functioning of western economies and the international financial 
system are called into question.11  The inherent dangers of state organizations acting without 
transparency in the capital market of free enterprise market economies relate both to economic 
activities with potential anticompetitive or outright political goals as well as more narrow, 
specific national security issues.  Now, must we be concerned with a new “balance of financial 
terror?” 
Concerns:  economic and national security threats 
 There is a wide range of potential economic threats, some even from the most well-
managed most transparent sovereign wealth funds.  For example, Backer (2009, p.  1272) argues “ 
. . Norway is consciously pursuing state policy indirectly through its funds.  Investment is clearly 
meant to project Norway’s political power by other means, and to move policy in particular 
directions . . .”  The Norwegian funds seek to maximize wealth, but rather than investing in 
benchmark indices dictated by the efficient markets hypothesis they look for market aberrations 
and seek ‘excess returns’ subject to strong explicit ‘ethical guidelines.’12  As a result the 
Norwegian Funds have, like private funds, become entangled with movements advocating 
corporate social responsibility guidelines, sanctions against Israel, and prohibitions against 
investment in Burma, to name a few.  The Norwegian model is often considered among the best, 
one in which the ownership interests of the government are separated from the economic 
activities of the fund, i.e., “public ownership, but effectively privately operated.”  Then, at best 
we would expect the funds to be influenced in ways similar to ways in which private funds are 
influenced and act accordingly, i.e., the route of traditional shareholder activism.  There has been 
no shortage of public interest groups advocating for the US or other developed countries to use 
their financial muscle to alter the behavior of foreign governments. 
 Direct commercial advantages for individual portfolio companies may also arise.  There is 
the potential for a perceived or actual unfair competitive advantage relative to the private sector. 
With a sovereign guarantee, explicit or implicit, portfolio firms may be able to obtain financing 
                                                            
10   Also see Truman (2010), Chapter 1. 
11   See Kimmitt (2008) and Slawotsky (2009). 
12  These guidelines are overseen by a Council of Ethics established by Royal Decree in 2004 and revised in 2005.  
See Backer (2009) p. 1277. 
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rates (or bailouts) not available in the private market. Further, access to foreign exchange may be 
facilitated or may actually be funneled through domestic enterprises which then invest abroad.13  
Or, perhaps more dramatically, a portfolio company may benefit from business information 
gained by the intelligence services of the home country.   
 Concerns though, reach far beyond traditional public interest group or shareholder 
activism and commercial advantages for individual firms.  Foreign governments, via sovereign 
wealth funds, could employ large pools of capital in non-commercial ways that are politically 
sensitive, to promote a foreign policy objective, even if not a national security threat.  They may 
act in ways more directly aligned with the national interests of their government or even with the 
assistance of other government agencies.  For example, a simple case would be for the SWF to 
pressure a portfolio company to open a production facility in the home country to create jobs.  
Slawotsky (2009) argues that SWFs will no longer be passive investors, but are becoming more 
active owners of large “flagship” international companies that will “allow them to influence 
corporate boards in dramatic ways, radically transforming corporate governance”.14  It is not 
necessary for a SWF to actively take control of a company, but a Board seat or outsized voting 
rights could provide leverage to influence firm activities.  While the potential for takeover of 
specific firms and potential market disruptions – for the products or resources that these firms 
produce - are very real, the influence of SWFs and their home country governments may be much 
more subtle.  Just the threat of withdrawal, explicit or implicit, could be sufficient to cause a 
portfolio firm or the firm’s government to alter its behavior. 
 Added to this threat is the potential for SWF activities to disrupt national capital markets 
or more readily, the value of an individual stock.  Sudden changes in portfolios by a major SWF 
or a group of aligned SWFs may disrupt the market with consequent real economic effects that 
may also have political effects, such as changing election outcomes.  However, Kimmitt (2008) 
argues that to date SWFs have been long term investors, who haven’t deviated from their long 
term strategies despite short term volatility and as a result may be seen as reducing market 
volatility. They provide liquidity, raise asset prices, and lower borrowing costs, thus contributing 
to financial market stability. During the global financial crisis SWFs made large investments in 
soon to be distressed financial institutions, stabilizing some of the firms, but taking large 
reductions in their portfolios just as other participants did. Nonetheless, if they take large, opaque 
positions and markets are illiquid then their actions, or even rumors of their actions, can increase 
volatility.  There is little evidence that this has happened in any significant way, however.  Beck 
and Fidora (2008) examine major portfolio changes of the Norwegian SWF and find no evidence 
                                                            
13 This is potentially the case for some activities of Samruk Kazyna in Kazakhstan. 
14   Slawotski (2009), p1241. 
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“for a stock price impact of non-commercially motivated stock sales by the Norwegian 
Government Pension Fund”.15  Rose (2008a) also argues that they are generally passive investors.  
 There are a host of national security issues that also arise.  One set of issues involve the 
transfer of science and technology via Board actions.  For example, transferring engineering 
studies and blue prints from a portfolio company to a domestic one as part of a joint venture or 
production agreement is a much more direct transfer than the reverse engineering required by the 
purchase of goods and services subject to the Wassenaar Agreement (successor to COCOM) 
review as in the past. A second issue involves international strategic objectives. Even if not overt, 
Slawotsky (2009) notes that international antagonisms may lie dormant during times of 
prosperity, but economic stress brings them to the surface and purposeful actions of SWFs may 
damage the interests of an antagonist.  Examples include the dispute between Russia and the 
Ukraine over natural gas and the sudden reduction in energy supplies to the Czech Republic when 
the Czechs agreed to host anti-missile radar facilities.  While these actions were by Gazprom, a 
Russian firm16, sovereign wealth funds can easily exert similar pressures via the portfolio firms in 
which they have influence.  Drezner (2008) offers two examples of political and economic 
turmoil resulting from SWF actions. E.g., the Norwegian Government Pension Fund shorted 
several financial sector stocks in Iceland, which then affected the entire economy.17  The purchase 
of a company connected with the Prime Minister of Thailand by Singapore’s Temasek was a key 
trigger of the coup in 2006.18  A third issue concerns the actions of the portfolio (or recipient) 
country’s government.  For political reasons it may take actions that favorably affect the holdings 
of a foreign SWF and benefit the foreign government.19  Drezner (2008) though, also clearly 
distinguishes between SWFs of democratic governments, which are more transparent and likely to 
act in a slower, predictable fashion, and those of authoritarian governments, which may act 
quickly and without recourse of the electorate.   
 Finally, as emerging economies develop control of global resources is of ever more 
importance.  The incentives to use SWF resources to advance national interests or direct supplies 
and knowledge of resources back to the home country will increase. Given that most sovereign 
wealth fund resources are in developing or resource-based economies, the position of developed 
economies may be challenged.    
                                                            
15 Beck and Fidora (2008) modestly claim their estimates are “back of the envelope”, but in fact the methodology is 
clear and well documented. Truman (2010), pp 46-52 discusses market turmoil and uncertainty.  Kotter and Lel 
(2008) find a positive announcement effect on the share price of recipient firms when a SWF invests in them, with 
the more transparent the SWF is the greater the effect, yet that over all SWFs are passive investors that invest in 
under-valued securities.  Sun and Hesse (2009), however, find no effect on equity markets due to SWF investing. 
16   Of course one might argue that it was simply a firm exercising monopoly power over the natural gas transmission 
lines that it controls and timing was just coincidental as Epstein and Rose (2009) seem to imply. 
17  This is in contrast to Beck and Fidora (2008). 
18  Drezner (2008), p 118.  He provides a broad survey of economic and security concerns. 
19   Slawotsky (2009) seems to suggest that the terms of the bailout of FNMA and GNMA favored China, which had 
very large positions in each.  However, there is little evidence of clear political bias in terms of the political regimes 
of countries in which SWFs invest.   Avendano and Santiso (2009) find that SWFs invest essentially the same as a 
group of mutual funds, and primarily for financial purposes. 
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 SWF home country concerns  
 It should be added that potential detrimental effects of SWF actions are not limited to 
recipient countries; they may also affect the home country.  Commodity based SWFs simply 
convert wealth in the form of natural resources in the ground into wealth held in more traditional 
financial assets. The new, more “spendable” form of wealth may generate increases in spending 
and GDP, generally a positive outcome, but the now realized wealth of the SWF may enable the 
continuation of undesirable macroeconomic and financial policies to the long run detriment of the 
country.  Governments must still provide sound macroeconomic policies: fiscal, monetary and 
exchange rate management.20  Market discipline could be lost and governments could make 
political decisions with adverse long run consequences because of the easy financing available if 
they can tap the SWF resources.  The economic benefits may also be lost, if they existed at all.  In 
fact Aslund (2007) claims “sovereign wealth funds are often a lousy bargain for the countries that 
have them” and in democracies there is no justification for their existence.21   It seems they are 
most prevalent in authoritarian, less developed countries where citizens cannot demand smarter 
economic policies.  But, there is a clear trade-off as the benefits of a well managed SWF with 
long run economic development objectives as a goal may prove beneficial in economies with no 
or underdeveloped capital markets.  
 To extend the argument, the existence of SWFs may hinder US policy goals abroad, like 
the process of democratization.  They create and empower a rentier class of political elites 
independent of the population and with no interest in economic growth or capital market 
development, per se. The government survives without the need for taxes upon the population to 
finance its activities, and therefore has no need to provide accountability of its actions.  The 
sometimes destabilizing movements of free markets are of no concern as SWF wealth can smooth 
domestic fluctuations and pacify restless populations. On the other hand, given the anti-American 
attitudes of some countries’ populations the US may be less inclined to promote democracy in 
authoritarian states if the state is friendly and has the financial wherewithal to continue in power. 
While macroeconomic policies may be altered by the existence of SWFs, the management 
of the SWF in and of itself may cause even more serious issues regarding the efficiency with 
which resources are used, the pattern of economic development, and social and economic 
disruptions, legal or otherwise.  Many SWFs lack clarity in their organizational structure, have ill 
defined governance mechanisms, lack accountability and transparency and suffer from poorly 
designed or non-existent financial management policies. The lack of independent auditors or 
published annual reports and therefore very opaque balance sheets leaves room for behavior that 
may be questionable.  As a result, in some cases neither the domestic population nor international 
partners or foreign governments trust the actions of SWFs.22  Critics claim that they are a major 
                                                            
20  For further discussion of a general nature see Lu, et al. (2010). 
21  See Aslund (2007). 
22   The survey of perceptions of SWFs by Hill & Knowlton Penn Schoen Berland (2010) attempts to address this 
issue.  It is noted that “At a time of great volatility and uncertainty, sovereign wealth funds represent an extremely 
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source or even the principle source of graft and corruption in their respective economies. The 
claims that SWFs lead to an inefficient distribution of financial assets and therefore lower rates of 
growth in GDP or other measures of economic well-being must be taken seriously, until evidence 
of their behavior indicates otherwise. 
Policy responses  
  There is often a clear conflict between investment policies and national security issues, 
and as a result there have been three general responses on the part of recipients of SWF 
investments.  First, there is a general call by recipient countries23 for greater transparency of 
activities, clearly defined and monitored corporate governance, and better measures of the impact 
of their behavior at a minimum as if the SWF were a private sector firm (an investment company 
or mutual fund company).24  Second, is a call for improved regulation and greater scrutiny of 
SWF activities in the recipient countries, again, at least as if it were a privately held firm. And 
third, there has been a re-examination of existing national security mechanisms bringing greater 
awareness to potential SWF actions. All assume that the accumulation of assets by sovereign 
wealth funds is appropriate to begin with, which is debatable in itself, particularly in democratic, 
developed market economies. 
Transparency and Governance 
 To address the first issue, there have been several attempts to evaluate or “score” SWFs 
(the “TS” below).  The most notable and best documented measure of overall SWF behavior is 
that developed by Edwin Truman at the Peterson Institute.25  In addition, Hill & Knolton and 
Penn Schoen Berland (2010) examine the “attitudes of national elites [in seven countries] toward 
[19] Sovereign funds and their countries” including Kazakhstan, and Standard and Poor’s 
provides a very comprehensive measure of the quality of corporate governance for selected 
clients, including an evaluation of firms in Kazakhstan for the Kazakhstan government.26   While 
the Standard and Poor’s Governance measure is very comprehensive, it focuses only on a subset 
of the activities evaluated in Truman’s scoreboard.  A second comprehensive measure of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
important source of capital for the global economy. Despite this importance, many nations appear to view these funds 
with caution, and  no matter how large the pool of funds on offer, some SWFs could find their path to the most 
attractive investments blocked.”  
23  Interestingly, in many home countries the lack of transparency is not considered an issue, perhaps because of the 
lack of democratic political systems 
24   Given the appropriate transparency and disclosures OECD guidelines then argue that recipient countries should 
treat SWFs just as any other domestic firm, the “principle of regulatory proportionality,” discussed below. 
25  His efforts have gone through several iterations, the most recent reported in detail in Truman (2010). He also 
compares the 33 components of his index to the Santiago Principles, discussed below, and looks at correlation with 
other indicators such as the Heritage Index of Economic Freedom, the World Economic Forum Global 
Competitiveness index, inter alia. Also the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute prepares the Linaburg-Maduell 
Transparency Index.  However, ironically, the methodology is not clearly documented, making the Sovereign Wealth 
Fund Institute itself not very transparent.  Truman discusses the Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index and makes 
comparisons to his own work.  While Truman’s scoring may be subjective, it is transparent. 
26 Hill and Knowlton Penn Schoen Berland (2010) and Pastoukova, et al (2009). 
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transparency is the Linaburg-Maduell transparency index (LMTI). The scoring methodology is 
not clear, but the coverage of funds is quite large.  Both the LMTI and the TS are reported in 
Table 3a.  These measures, while they often do not agree, clearly illustrate the highly diverse 
nature of the management of SWFs. The details of the Truman Score are further revealing.  
 The overall score that Truman calculates is based upon 33 individual criteria grouped into 
indicators evaluating the structure (including fiscal treatment), governance, transparency and 
accountability (which includes investment strategy implementation, investment activities, 
reporting, audits) and behavior.27  For 53 sovereign wealth funds of 37 countries each of 33 
criteria are scored and the total score in percent of the maximum possible is reported. The scores 
range from 11 to 97. The highest score is for Norway’s Government Pension Fund – Global, at 
97.  Most of the SWFs with scores above 80 are from developed economies such as Norway, the 
US, New Zealand, Canada, France, Ireland, Netherlands, Japan and Australia. However, Timor-
Leste and Trinidad and Tobago are also included in that range.  The lowest scores, less than 20, 
include SWFs from the United Arab Emirates, Sudan and Qatar.  Kazakhstan’s National Oil Fund 
is in the middle of the pack with a score of 65.  Samruk Kazyna is not scored.  However, it is 
difficult to compare SWF scores, especially for those in the middle of the range, since the scores 
for the individual components vary widely, and their relative importance varies.  Nonetheless, the 
scoring provides a basis for discussions of specific problematic issues and concerns, and some 
general conclusions emerged.  Specifically, 1)  pension SWFs score higher than non-pension 
SWFs; 2) for non-pension SWFs, those that are members of the IFSWF (International Forum of 
Sovereign Wealth Funds, formerly the IMF Working Group on Sovereign Wealth Funds, which 
drafted the Santiago Principles) score higher than non-members; 3) for non-pension SWFs, those 
from OECD countries score much higher than non-OECD countries; 4) of non-OECD SWFs the 
non-Middle East SWFs score higher than the Middle East SWFs; 5) of the non-OECD SWFs 
Asian SWFs score higher than non-Asian SWFs.28 
 Many of the issues found in Truman’s scoreboard have been discussed by individual 
countries and international organizations (the OECD and IMF in particular) for years.  Due to the 
wide divergence of interests and contentious nature of the issues such as the tension between 
market liberalism and state directed actions and nationalism in the SWF home country and the 
conflict between foreign investment policies and national security issues in recipient countries,  a 
formal treaty, law or organization has not emerged. Instead, a voluntary set of best practices, the 
Santiago Principles, has emerged from the long discussions of the IMF Working Group (IWG) on 
Sovereign Wealth Funds.29  Table 4 provides these principles. There are 24 specific principles 
(some disaggregated further) to which the international working group agreed and which address 
many of the issues raised regarding the management of sovereign wealth funds.  The signatories 
                                                            
27   See Truman (2010), Chapter 5 for details of the latest scorings. 
28    See Truman (2010), Table 5.2.  All of these differences are statistically significant at least at the 5% level except 
item 5). 
29   See IMF (2008), IWG (2008) OECD (2008, 2009a, 2009b).  Gray (2010) provides an overview of the OECD 
perspective and a good source of relevant OECD documents. 
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either already adhere to these guidelines or agree to implement them.  Kazakhstan is neither a 
member nor an observer of the IWG. In addition, a new organization, the International Forum for 
Sovereign Wealth Funds, was created to continue discussion.  However, the Principles, are 
voluntary and there is no means of external monitoring for compliance, evaluation or 
enforcement. Truman (2010, Appendix 6A) compares these principles point by point with his 
scoreboard criteria, noting extensive overlap, which suggests that Truman’s scorecard is close to a 
measurable benchmark for the Santiago Principles. If so, it is then obvious that the degree of 
compliance varies widely.  And of course, what score may be considered satisfactory in any 
sense? 
 The Santiago Principles, while a useful first step, are not considered sufficient to address 
all of the issues raised above and not without critics, especially due to their voluntary nature 
(Signatories agree to abide by them; until they decide not to do so).  Transparency and better 
governance is essential for both host and recipient country governments.  But recipient country 
governments are still left to address concerns of anti-competitiveness, market disruptions, 
political influence and national security issues on their own. “Because sovereign wealth funds are 
owned by and ultimately controlled by governments, it is naïve to believe that they can or should 
be treated as apolitical.  The standards applied to sovereign wealth funds should be higher than 
those applied to private sector institutions precisely because they are governmental institutions 
that are not subject to the discipline of the market and ultimately are accountable to the citizens of 
their countries.”30    
Lee (2009) calls the Santiago Principles a ‘thin’ financial rule of law, noting they and the 
OECD Declaration on SWFs cannot even be labeled “soft law” because they were issued by 
specific interest groups of states.  The language, terms like ‘principles’ and ‘practices,’ suggest 
informality and flexibility, not ‘code’ or ‘regulations’ which suggest hard rules or law.  They form 
a ‘soft and unenforceable framework’ for the ‘facilitation of the understanding and 
implementation of the principles,’ absent a central regulator or enforcer.  They form only a broad 
framework and process for recipient and home country to reach a common understanding and 
practice. Still, the Principles may form the basis of global cooperation or governance 
supplementing domestic regulation until a consensus for international law emerges.  But, what 
incentive do the governments of major SWFs have to subject themselves to additional 
international law?  Individual governments must respond in their own interest while international 
discussions continue.31 
Greater recipient country regulation and oversight 
 The response of each of the many recipient countries has varied, but the US framework on 
investment policies and national security issues and the OECD guidelines for treatment of SWFs 
                                                            
30 Truman (2008). 
 
31   The OECD Guidelines, however, may provide a framework for all. 
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by recipient countries may both be representative.  In the US framework there are two distinct 
areas of concern:  1) the size of ownership in publicly owned firms and 2) national security issues. 
Regarding size of investments, there is a long standing body of law relating to the size of 
ownership of public firms that must be publicly acknowledged.  Currently an acquisition of more 
than 5% of a publicly owned corporation requires a 13(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 
1934 filing.  However, SWFs do not have to meet the more stringent requirements of registered 
investment companies. Investment disclosure then is up to the individual SWF and these policies 
vary considerably, as Truman’s scoring clearly indicates. In addition, multiple aligned SWFs may 
own just less than 5% ownership and thus avoid the filing requirement.  Slawotsky (2009) argues 
that the inherent dangers of sovereign ownership of domestic firms should require that all 
holdings of SWFs from the same country, and all holdings of SWFs of aligned (explicit or tacit) 
countries (e.g., OPEC or GCC countries), should be aggregated and treated as one and new 
thresholds applied.32  The number of distinct SWFs varies by country.  The UAE and sub-national 
government units have 9 SWFs, Singapore has two.33  There is great variation in the investment 
strategy of SWFs as well.  China’s Chinese Investment Corporation has almost $300 billion in 
assets, investing about one third abroad.  The Government of Singapore Investment Corporation 
GSIC), does not own any assets, but manages $248 billion for the Singapore government and 
invests 100% abroad, while Temasek Holdings, which does own assets and focuses on investing 
in emerging Asia, has about $120 billion and about two thirds is invested abroad.34  (See Table 
1for approximate shares of investments made abroad). The varying  number of SWFs in different 
countries, diverse investment strategies and legal ownership status complicate a recipient 
country’s perceptions and response to SWF investments. 
 Another related concern apparently not yet acknowledged or addressed should be the 
actions of agents of sovereign wealth funds.  For example, in February of 2011 it was reported 
that the China Investment Corporation and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange 
employed a company called “SSBT OD05 Omnibus Account Treaty Clients” to invest US$19.4 
billion in seven major Japanese companies.  This obscure company is now listed as one of the top 
ten holders of each of the Japanese companies.35  A similar “distant owner” transaction may 
involve a company that is a joint venture outside the boundaries of one of the joint venture 
partners that may be providing advanced technology. The joint venture itself then may receive 
SWF investments that could influence the activities of the joint venture with regard to technology 
transfer, production decisions and so forth.  When the joint venture’s host country has weak 
                                                            
32   See the many references to Slawotsky (2009) for examples. 
33   Truman (2010), p. 16. 
34   (Assets as if March 2008) Singapore’s set up with the GISC managing government assets, but not owning them, 
and Temasek, owning assets and managing them, seems to be the model Kazakhstan is following.  Both are private 
companies incorporated under Singapore’s Companies Act (Cap. 50 Rev. Ed  2006),  Lee (2009).  Kazakhstan seems 
to be following this model with the National Oil Fund not owning, but managing assets of the government and 
Samruk Kazyna, a holding company, owned by the government, owning and managing individual companies. 
35  See “China Makes Stealth Investments in Japan,” The Wall Street Journal February 25-27, 2011. 
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monitoring practices and the technology provider’s home country is too far removed to effectively 
monitor the use of the technology, sensitive transactions may take place unnoticed. 
 Despite the conflict between welcoming investment policies and national security issues 
and the lack of transparency and potential political behavior, Epstein and Rose (2009) argue that 
new regulation is not necessary at this time.  The “nightmare scenarios” that critics of SWFs warn 
against are unlikely and if they occur will be identified by existing laws-either existing business 
regulation of securities and antitrust or national security laws.  The Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act or any existing international law does not provide immunity from existing US law. Specific 
national security concerns are addressed in several ways:36  The Exon-Florio Amendment to the 
Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, restricts potential investments on the basis of 
National Security.  The more recent Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 
(FINSA) requires additional scrutiny and higher level clearances for transactions that may result 
in a foreign entity controlling a company engaged in interstate commerce.37 These investments 
are reviewed by the interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the US, CFIUS, which is 
designed to review investments in a way that assures national security issues are addressed 
without hindering participation in US capital markets.38  The CFIUS may block a transaction or 
require mitigation, for example, require that the SWF remain passive or the recipient company 
withhold sensitive information from the SWF investor.  But what type of transactions should be 
scrutinized?   Moran (2009) identifies three distinct threats that the CFIUS must, in his view, 
focus upon: 1) any acquisition that would lead to US dependency on a foreign supplier of  goods 
or services who may delay, deny or place conditions upon the provision of  those goods, 2) any 
proposed acquisition that would transfer technology or expertise to a foreign government that may 
then use it to harm the US, 3) any acquisition that would insert a means for infiltration, 
surveillance or sabotage (human or otherwise)  in goods and services crucial to the functioning of 
the economy.39  He concludes that while the vast majority of foreign transactions pose no risk, 
cases on the margin are likely to remain problematic.40  Epstein and Rose (2009) still argue that 
SWFs, with few exceptions, have been model investors, and thus there is already sufficient 
regulatory authority in place.  Additional regulation may lead to investment protectionism and a 
reduction in the efficiency of global capital markets.  As a result, recipient country regulation 
varies from country to country and this remains an unsettled question for ongoing discussion.  
Investment Protectionism  
 
                                                            
36   See Lee (2009). 
37   See Bahgat  (2010) p. 235, and Epstein and Rose (2009)  p. 118, and Rose (2008) for additional details. 
 
38  For an extensive review and critique of the CFIUS process see Moran (2009). 
39  This, of course, presupposes that the appropriate licensing  or regulatory agencies have already screened the 
investments to comply with other US industry specific requirements. 
40  Note from Table 2 in the Appendix, the UAE owns 8% of Advanced Micro Devices.  Is this a problem?  
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There is a clear dichotomy between national security policy and investment policy of 
open, market-oriented economies. While recipient country national security concerns are 
legitimate, most argue that there are sufficient legal tools to address these issues without intruding 
into investment policy issues.  The OECD initiated a lengthy review of issues under the Freedom 
of Investment Process in 2006 and issued several reports including the OECD Guidelines for 
Recipient Country Investment Policies Relating to National Security approved by the 
governments in 2008, designed to prevent investment protectionism, and ensure that SWF 
investments are received in a non-discriminatory fashion. The OECD framework for host country 
treatment of SWFs argues that SWFs should be regarded just as other institutional investors, 
complying with OECD Investment Guidelines requiring adherence to the principles of 
transparency, non-discrimination, liberalization and standstills.41  In addition, 
transparency/predictability, regulatory proportionality and accountability of recipient country 
treatment of SWF activities are also emphasized.  Here, recipient country 
transparency/predictability requires “codification and publication of laws regarding investment, 
prior notification to interested parties about plans to modify investment strategies, consultation of 
these strategies with other counterparts and the disclosure of investment policy actions.”  The 
regulatory proportionality principle requires that recipient country restrictions on investment 
should not be greater than is needed to ensure national security.42  And, the accountability 
principle is a mechanism to guarantee periodic regulatory impact assessments, parliamentary 
oversight and other supervisory activities.43   OECD countries, including the US, readily meet 
nearly all aspects of these principles in general, but take widely varying routes to do so. 
 
 In summary, most issues regarding sovereign wealth fund activities are well understood 
but SWF home country as well as recipient country policies vary substantially.  Further, it is 
difficult to generalize the conduct of individual sovereign wealth funds because the objectives, 
governance, performance and transparency of each vary widely.  Nonetheless, it is possible to 
apply this background knowledge to the funds of Kazakhstan.  
 
 
III.  The Funds of Kazakhstan44 
                                                            
41   See OECD (2008c) 
42 Further, “they should be avoided when other existing measures are adequate and appropriate to address national 
security concerns. Most countries assign little or no role for investment policy in managing the national security risks. 
Among those countries that do use investment policy for protecting national security, risks to be addressed through 
investment reviews included: infiltration of the national economy by organized crime or terrorists; loss of control of 
key resources needed for national defense, impeding law enforcement, and loss of control of border or security 
sensitive geographic locations.” Other threats that several countries explicitly state as concerns warranting legal 
restraints include  threats related to:  money laundering ; protection of state secrets; diversion of strategic capabilities 
for military purposes; investments which might hinder efforts of international organizations to maintain international 
peace and security. OECD (2008b).  
 
 
43 See OECD (2008c) for a more detailed description of the policies for Sovereign Wealth Funds and recipient 
country policies, OECD (2008b) for the OECD declaration on Sovereign Wealth Funds, the Freedom of Investment 
Process and the OECD General Investment Policy Principles. 
 
44 Much of the content of this section is derived from interviews in Almaty and Astana. 
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 In Kazakhstan there are four distinct funds or organizations that may be of interest:  the 
pension fund, the NBK foreign currency reserves portfolio, and the two funds that are the focus of 
this report:  the National Fund for the Future of Kazakhstan, sometimes simply called the national 
fund or the oil fund, which contains assets owned by the Ministry of Finance and managed by the 
National Bank of Kazakhstan; and Samruk Kazyna, the Sovereign Wealth Fund, a joint stock 
company owned by the Ministry of Finance.  The national pension fund does not fall under the 
jurisdiction of the National Bank or Samruk Kazyna and the management of foreign currency 
reserves is the responsibility of the Treasury Department of the NBK, along with the management 
of the National Fund. The pension fund and foreign currency reserve management are not the 
main focus of this paper, but are tangentially related. 
An aside on the pension system. 
 As mentioned among the types of funds categorized in the previous section, many SWFs 
explicitly or partially serve as pension reserve funds (e.g., Norway).  In Kazakhstan this is not the 
case.  The pension system is not funded and there are no assets to manage at the aggregate level. 
There are three components to the pension system: 1) the basic plan which provides minimal 
(anti-poverty) benefits to everyone with a work history.  2) The “Solidarity” system provides 
benefits for everyone with a work history prior to January 1, 1998.  Benefits are paid directly 
from the national budget and there is no explicit payment or contribution by individuals or firms 
toward this system.  (Note that firms pay a social tax for each employee, but these payments go to 
local budgets).  Benefits for both of these have occasionally been adjusted in discrete steps for 
changes in the cost of living, but benefit payments come directly from the national budget.  3) The 
post-transition private “Accumulation” accounts for all individuals with work experience after 
January 1, 1998.  Individuals contribute 10% of earnings to a private account managed by various 
financial institutions or insurance companies.  Individuals have a choice among several 
investment options.  The principle contribution, plus an allowance for inflation, is guaranteed by 
the government, but the earnings of the investment options are not.  The moral hazard problems 
are obvious and a reform of the Accumulation Account system is expected.  Under the proposed 
new framework investment options within the accounts will be classified as conservative, 
moderate and aggressive.  Only the conservative options will be insured by the government.   
The National Fund of Kazakhstan 
  The National Fund of Kazakhstan is not a legal entity, but literally a fund of assets created 
by Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan  (# 42 "On National Fund of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan" August 23, 2000), essentially owned by the Ministry of Finance, 
overseen by a Management Council, and managed by the National Bank of Kazakhstan (NBK).  
The Council members, appointed by the President of Kazakhstan, are the President, the Prime 
Minister, the Chairman of the Senate, the Chairman of the Majilis (the lower house), the 
Chairman of the National Bank, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister of Finance, and the 
Chairman of the Accounting Committee for the Control of the Execution of the National Budget 
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(See Table 5 below).  The Management Council sets the general governance policies and general 
investment strategy.45  Typically, the overall investment strategy is evaluated and modified once 
per year. While the overall investment parameters are set by the Council, with advice from the 
National Bank, the portfolio is managed by the Treasury Department of the NBK.  The Treasury 
Department also manages the foreign currency reserves of the NBK independent of the National 
Fund.    
   The Fund's dollar foreign currency assets are accumulated on the account of the 
Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan with the National Bank of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan. The total market value of the National Fund assets as of December 31, 2001, stood at 
US$ 1,240,372,900 and they were allocated roughly US$900 million to the savings portfolio (or 
fund) and just over US$300 million to the stability portfolio (or fund).  There were three 
Presidential decrees clarifying the purpose and operations of the National Fund through the 
2000s.  The latest decree, “ On the concept of formation and use of the National Fund of 
Kazakhstan,” by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan on April 2, 2010 № 962, the so 
called “New Concept,” abrogated the earlier decrees and  provided much more specific guidelines 
for the use of funds.46 
 The assets of the fund have grown steadily from just over US$8 billion in 2005 to 
US$41.6 billion in 2010 (See figure 1 below).  Revenues, or receipts, of the Fund have grown 
steadily from 2005 to 2008, and then were relatively flat in 2008-2010.  Receipts consist of direct 
budget transfers (the initial endowment of the fund), direct taxes (of several types, detailed below) 
other oil sector receipts, revenues from privatization, and sales of land and investment income.  
After the initial establishment of the fund, direct taxes and investment income are the major 
sources of revenues, and as illustrated in Figure 3, these have varied over the 2005-2010 period.  
Direct taxes, a function of overall economic activity and the world price of oil, have varied 
significantly with a steep increase in 2008, a fall in 2009 and recovery in 2010. Investment 
income has also varied with a dramatic increase in 2009 and fall in 2010.  The uses of the funds 
are limited to three categories  (See figure 2). Guaranteed transfers to the government are a 
primary source of funding for the government budget and grew from US$2.1 billion in 2002 to 
                                                            
45   The Council also approves, at least nominally, the uses of the fund, investment strategy proposals made by the 
Treasury Department of the NBK, the quarterly reports of the Fund, and the auditors, currently Ernst and Young 
Kazakhstan, Ltd..  Neither the quarterly reports nor the audit is published.  The annual report/audit of Samruk-
Kazyna is published. 
46   CPGA of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2010, № 27, Art. 203 and the following earlier decrees, 1) President of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan dated September 1, 2005 № 1641 "On the Concept of formation and use of the National 
Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan for the medium term" (CPGA of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2005, № 35, Art. 
480, 2007, № 17 , Art. 186, 2009, № 1-2, Art. 1);   2) President of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated May 29, 2007 № 
336 "On amending the Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated September 1, 2005 № 1641" 
(CPGA of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2007, № 17, Art. 186);  3) President of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 
January 19, 2009 № 725 "On Amending the Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated September 
1, 2005 № 1641" (CPGA of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2009, № 1-2, Art. 1),  have been abrogated. 
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US$8.1 billion in 2010.  The “New Concept” now limits these transfers to approximately US$8 
billion. So called “targeted transfers” are those direct transfers to Samruk Kazyna as part of the 
response to the financial crisis and were limited to 2008 and 2009.47  The remaining category, 
relatively small, is management and external audit expenses.  In the aggregate the Fund has 
accumulated assets every year since its inception, as illustrated in Figure 4.  For 2010 revenues 
from direct taxes have recovered while investment income has fallen significantly (Figures 3 and 
5).  Figure 6 illustrates the composition of the direct taxes received in 2010.  Taxes arising from 
production sharing and royalties account for about two thirds of revenues, with oil and gas lease 
payments accounting for another 20%. Excess profits taxes and corporate income taxes account 
for about 9%. 
 The revenues and earnings are predominately in foreign currency and initially allocated to 
the stability portfolio. Some portions are then transferred to the savings portfolio or disbursed to 
the national government. There is a small portion of revenues denominated in Tenge and these are 
maintained in the “Domestic Account” of the Fund and managed and controlled directly by the 
Ministry of Finance.  Prior to the 2010 Decree disbursements were determined by a formula, the 
parameters of which were subject to the annual approval of Parliament. This method, however, 
was subject to political manipulation by potential recipients and led to rather large variability in 
disbursements to the budget.  The National Oil Fund management had requested changes in the 
calculations of disbursements as early as 2004.  The financial crisis and the sudden increase in 
requests for resources from the Fund revealed the weaknesses of the system and led to the 
implementation of “fiscal responsibility legislation,” the so called “New Concept.”48  
 As a result of the global financial crisis the latest decree provided a one-time massive 
transfer of assets (partially a capital grant or direct transfer, partially the purchase of long term 
bonds of Samruk-Kazyna) equivalent to over 10% of GDP, and a change in the future use of 
National Fund revenues.49  While the previous mechanism allowed year-to-year fluctuations in 
transfers from the National Fund, limited to one third of the Fund’s assets, the current mechanism 
sets the guaranteed transfer to the national budget at $US8 billion and restricts its use to 
supporting the industrialization program detailed in the Strategic Plan for 2020.50   There are two 
goals, one regarding the assets of the fund and one regarding the government deficit.  The 2020 
goal for the Fund is that the assets reach no less than 30% of GDP, or $US90 billion (projected).   
While 30% of GDP by 2020 is a goal, the minimum balance of the Fund, for savings purposes, for 
this period was set at no less than 20% of forecasted GDP.  Thus, the broad goals of the Fund, 
                                                            
47  The bailout included the purchase of bonds and direct transfers.  The data in the table accompanying Figure 2 do 
not include purchases of bonds since those are simply a change in the portfolio and remain in the fund itself. 
48 See Ossowski, et al. (2008), pp. 12-14 for a discussion of fiscal responsibility legislation.  Note their 
characterizations of the Kazakhstan National Fund in Table  A3.2 p.30 are now out of date. 
49   Note that there was a concerted effort by authorities of Samruk Kazayna to take complete control of the National 
Fund, using its assets for anti-crisis needs and accelerated infrastructure development, but those efforts failed.  
However, there is still a powerful group that continues to argue for the merger of the National Fund and Samruk 
Kazyna.  
50  See Strategic Plan (2011). 
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stabilization and savings, have not changed.  However, the New Concept places more 
responsibility for a balanced government budget upon the Parliament, eventually restricting the 
use of Fund disbursements to finance the development budget rather than current expenditures.  In 
addition, the New Concept stipulates that there will be no further loans from the Fund to the 
government.  Budget policies then will require a reduction in the non-oil deficit to meet the 
second 2020 goal of a non-oil deficit of 3% of GDP, down from the current 9%. 51    
Details of Management of National Fund Portfolio52  
 The National Fund is unrelated to Samruk Kazyna (which is called the Sovereign Wealth, 
or Welfare, Fund, and was created in 2008).  There are two main functions of the National Fund: 
1) to provide economic stability and 2) to accumulate savings for future generations.  There are 
three distinct portfolios:  a dollar denominated stability fund, a dollar denominated savings fund, 
both managed by the NBK, and a smaller tenge denominated fund managed by the Ministry of 
Finance.  The latter is not managed by the NBK and is much smaller.  The National Fund is 
simply an account of the government at the NBK, with the Ministry of Finance as the responsible 
governing body.  The initial market value was $1.2 billion, with 900 million in the savings fund 
and 300 million in the stabilization fund.  The Treasury Dept of the NBK wrote the initial 
investment guidelines, closely following those of the Norwegian SWF.53  The same portfolio 
management team manages the foreign reserves of the NBK and the National Fund.  They are 
clearly distinct however, with different accounts and custodians, and different objectives. 
 The investment guidelines for the stability fund call for a high degree of liquidity with the 
6 month US T-bill as the benchmark and US$ as the base currency.  The savings fund was 
initially 40% global equities and 60% global fixed income.  There were two changes in portfolio 
allocation from 40-60 to 25-75 and again to 20-80 in 2007 and 2008.  Note that this allocation 
may be quite different than some analysts assume for the typical SWF allocations.  For example, 
Jen (2007, 2011) assumes the typical allocation is 45% equities, 25% bonds and 30% alternative 
investments, but to make such generalizations about the “typical” SWF portfolio allocations is not 
very useful as the objectives, investment horizon, risk tolerance, risk management strategy and 
preference for liquidity varies widely across SWFs.54   The managers of the Kazakhstan National 
Fund currently appear much more conservative and as a result were less affected by the crash in 
equity prices during the global financial crisis. In fact, the changed allocations greatly improved 
                                                            
51   The New Concept does not completely break the link between the government budget and the National Fund 
since government debt financing maximums are linked to Fund revenues. It proposes that the annual cost of servicing 
government debt should not exceed the annual conditional fixed investment income of the National Fund of 4.5%, 
and the annual average cost of repayment and servicing government debt should not exceed 15% of revenues, 
including transfers from the National Fund. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs (March 3, 2010.) 
52 From interview. 
53   The Norwegian fund also shared their experiences, RFPs and other technical materials to assist the Kazakhstan 
NOF. 
54   Trueman (2010), p. 18.  He argues “[t]he result can be a near infinite number of possible portfolio allocations for 
a particular fund or across funds.”  Also see Preqin Sovereign Wealth Fund Review (2010). 
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performance during the financial crisis, -2.5% vs -23% (or so) for the Norwegian SWF.  The 
changes in overall portfolio allocations are made by the NOF management committee and then 
the specific benchmarks are chosen by the NBK team. These have varied and  include MSCI 
benchmark, ex-energy, and CitiGroup World Govt Bond Index, then customized  90% CitiGroup 
WGBI ex-Japan plus 10% Japan.  All have a tracking error limit of 2%.  The portfolio for the 
savings fund as described in Table 1 appears to be a textbook “conservative allocation” of 
investment resources, and this allocation has performed very well during the financial crisis.    
 The fixed income portfolio is managed internally, with 80% in the index with a tracking 
error of 2%, and 20% active.  Originally it was split between the NBK team and external 
managers, but the three year moving average returns favored the NBK team so they fired two 
external managers and moved the entire portfolio to the NBK.  External managers now provide 
expertise in new asset classes and allow the NBK team to gain experience.   
 The equities portfolio is still externally managed.  The original portfolio was $200 million, 
but it is now much larger and fully managed by external firms.  The NBK team  used the request 
for proposals of the Norwegian SWF as a basis for their own solicitation of  proposals.  Managers 
were selected on the basis of historic results, experience, and stability of the management team in 
the last 5-7 years, fee levels and credit worthiness of the company.  There are now 14 firms that 
are evaluated on “results and readiness.”  At the moment there are no investments in private 
capital, but discussions with the NOF management committee concerning this option will begin 
this year.  The trading and management team of the NBK Treasury realize that they are not yet 
ready as they don’t have the expertise for such investments.  However, they are planning and 
preparing to add investment grade corporate and emerging market global bonds to the bond 
portfolio and also to increase the share of the equity portfolio.  These changes have been under 
consideration for some time, because the management committee generally considers changes in 
strategy once per year, upon the recommendation of the NBK team. 
Table 1:  Current Portfolio Allocation of Savings Fund (February 15, 2011) 
 80% Government Bonds   20% Global Equities 
 40%  US$     40%  S&P 500 
 35%  €     35%  Dow Jones Stocks 
 10%  £      10%  FTSE 100 
 10%  ¥      10%  NKY 225 
  5%  Aus$      5%   S&P 200 Aus$ 
 
 __________ 
Notes:  Duration on the government bond portfolio was lowered from 1-10 years to 1-5 years. 
Benchmark for equities portfolio is MSCI. 
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 The “New Concept” for the NOF emphasizes the savings function and this fund will be 
increased until 2020 with a goal of approximately 30% of GDP.55  Funds received first flow into 
the stabilization fund, and then are later reallocated to the savings fund.  All receipts and 
expenditures are from the stability fund, leaving the savings fund untouched. 
 The recent transactions with Samruk Kazyna are seen as one-time events. (See figure 2). 
About $10 billion was involved in the transactions, with $5 billion in bonds purchased by the 
National Oil Fund and $5 billion in a direct transfer from the NOF to SK.  The direct transfer 
came in part from the tenge “domestic” account of the National Fund managed by the Ministry of 
Finance and $2-3 billion from the Stability Fund of the NOF.  Note the domestic part of the NOF 
is the result of tenge denominated taxes that flow into the fund (others are dollar denominated and 
flow to the stability and savings funds of the NOF, managed by the NBK).  While 90% of the 
funds went to acquire ownership and recapitalize banks,56 real estate and construction firms, 
US$1 billion went to KazAgro, a joint stock company wholly owned by the Ministry of 
Agriculture.  According to the “New Concept,” future transfers will be no more than “budgetary 
needs,” currently set at $8 billion per year, until 2020.   
 While “one time events” like the use of NOF assets during the financial crisis were the 
subject of intense discussion and explained to the public, regular changes in performance may be 
ascertained by examining the balance sheet reports (on-line and with no discussion of operations). 
The National Oil Fund produces quarterly reports that are approved by the Management Board, 
Ministry of Finance and the government, but these are not published for the public.  Significant 
events are included in the Annual Report of the NBK, but obviously transparency remains an 
issue.57  
 As noted above, the pursuit of the typical goals of saving current wealth for future 
generations, limiting the effects of resource price shocks and potential “Dutch Disease,” and 
providing a smooth flow of funding for government needs must be consistent with the country’s 
macroeconomic policies.  Because of the unusually large amount of resources at the disposal of 
the government the activities of the SWF impact both fiscal and monetary policy and the balance 
of payments.  Similarly, these resources can be and actually were used by SWFs to limit the 
effects of the global economic crisis of 2007-2009.  In general the impact of SWF activities on 
                                                            
55  Note though that contributions to the National Fund should be a residual – that amount of excess foreign 
exchange inflows from oil and natural resource flows, above that amount needed for development and non‐
inflationary development and macroeconomic policy goals.  This depends on global demand and world prices for 
these exports.   
56 Samruk Kazyna has acquired from 25% to 100% ownership of five banks. Three, BTA, Alliance and Temir were 
restructured at a cost of about US$6 billion to the government and about US$15 to foreign creditors, with original 
shareholders being wiped out. Halyk and KazKom received smaller capital injections in 2009.  Halyk is the only one 
emerging from state control, repurchasing its shares yielding a 14% return to the government.  KazKom may emerge, 
but not soon.  The other three have not yet recovered. 
57  However, Truman does rank the NOF high on this account. Table 5.1 p 72-73 of Trueman (2010)  
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macro-financial balances must be evaluated in terms of long-run objectives, but more specifically 
the actions of SWFs during the financial crisis must be evaluated in terms of the immediate anti-
crisis impact as well as long term costs and benefits.58  
 Certainly, in the case of Kazakhstan the government’s use of the resources of the National 
Oil Fund was critical in limiting the impact of the global crisis on the domestic economy.  The 
“bailout” operation illustrates how closely the government administration, the Ministry of Finance 
and the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade (formerly the Ministry of Economy and 
Budget Planning), the National Oil Fund, and Samruk Kazyna are intertwined, and will jointly 
serve as the primary means of achieving the 2020 Strategic Plan for the Development of 
Kazakhstan.  In fact, the companies held by Samruk Kazyna are called on to implement about half 
(both in number and monetary value) of the projects to be implemented in the next five year 
program for accelerated industrialization and innovation.  At the moment it is unlikely that the 
National Fund itself will be called upon to support these efforts, but in the future both political 
discipline and economic circumstances remain determining factors.   
Samruk Kazyna 
  The National Oil Fund is the fund most comparable to other sovereign wealth funds 
around the world, but a second legal entity, Sovereign Wealth Fund Samruk Kazyna (S-K), a joint 
stock company with the government (Ministry of Finance) as the sole shareholder, is also 
officially labeled the Sovereign Wealth Fund.  While the National Fund is often referred to as 
“the” SWF or “the” Fund, S-K is actually much larger and much more important in terms of its 
effect on the economy.  The assets of Samruk Kazyna are difficult to value since many of the 
companies are not publicly traded, but estimates range from 50-80% of GDP, and sales or 
revenues of the companies is in the range of 20-30% of total GDP, perhaps higher.   
  The latest governing document is the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Sovereign 
Wealth Fund No. 134 – IV, signed by the President Nazurbayev on February 13, 2009.  “This 
Law determines legal status, operating procedures, tasks, objectives and scope of authority of the 
Sovereign Wealth Fund as well as special peculiarities of legal status of legal entities, shares 
(interests) of which are owned by Sovereign Wealth Fund and other organizations of the Fund.”  
The founding Presidential Decree dated October 13, 2008, No. 669 created Samruk Kazyna Joint 
Stock Company by merging two existing JSCs, Joint Stock Company Kazakhstan Holding for the 
Management of State Assets SAMRUK and Joint Stock Company KAZYNA Sustainable 
Development Fund, under the guidance of the State Property and Privatization Committee of the 
Ministry of Finance. Samruk was a holding company of the five large state monopolies, 
KazTelecom, KazRail, Kazmunigas, KazPost and KeGok (electricity distribution).  On the other 
hand, Kazyna JSC consisted mainly of regional Social-Entrepreneurship Companies focused on 
economic development issues and many were initially funded with resources from the National 
                                                            
58   See Lu, Mulder and Papaioannou (2010) for a brief discussion. 
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Oil Fund.  Now there are well over one hundred entities held by Samruk Kazyna, ranging from 
Air Astana to real estate ventures and newly acquired commercial banks.  The 36 largest 
companies are listed in Table 6 in the Appendix.  The total number of companies held is difficult 
to estimate because many of these companies have multiple subsidiaries.  
 There are several key, somewhat controversial issues concerning the operations of Samruk 
Kazyna that are a matter of continual public debate.  These range from corporate governance and 
transparency to ownership rights and claims on these assets and the income they produce to the 
legitimate roles of the state in directing the economic development of the country. Most of these 
issues are clearly recognized and are to some extent being addressed – e.g., every company now 
has an approved mission and a draft of strategic priorities, which are currently being updated.  
Nonetheless, the political debate is ongoing.   
The (draft) March/April statement of the government’s strategic plan identifies three broad 
objectives for Samruk Kazyna.  First, it must play a leading role in the diversification of the 
economy, lessening its dependence on natural resources.  Yet, it is noted that to date there have 
been no major successes spawning from SK initiatives.  The Development Bank will play a larger 
role, investing in designated areas of the economy and “national” companies will also assist.  In 
this regard it is expected that the government, via Samruk Kazyna, then will have a significant 
role, if not the dominant role, in establishing the direction of growth at least through 2014, at 
which time the private sector should have fully recovered and market forces are expected to play 
a greater role.  Initially the national economic strategy focused on seven industries, but now there 
are eleven priority sectors earmarked for investment and development.  The debate on the proper 
role that a state-owned organization like Samruk Kazyna has in a market oriented economy lies at 
the heart of these objectives.  Those in favor of a continued strong role for the government and 
state owned entities argue for limited privatizations with the revenues retained by Samruk Kazyna 
for further directed investments.  Those favoring the role of markets expect privatizations to 
shrink Samruk Kazyna leading to a smaller role of the state.59 Many of the details of the  methods 
of privatization and the disposition of privatization revenues is an open question. 
 This debate also ties into the second goal, to increase the efficiency and performance of 
companies held by Samruk Kazyna, both in the real sector, like KazMuniGas, and in the 
monetary sector, the banks and funds for entrepreneurship.  The objective is to manage them 
effectively, making them “national champions” comparable to their large international counter 
parts.   To some participants of this debate Temasek of Singapore appears to be a model for 
Samruk Kazyna.  However, Temasek has more foreign investments and less of a development 
objective than Samruk Kazyna’s stated objectives at the moment.  No doubt Samruk Kazyna will 
focus on the implementation of several large investment projects, taking measures to increase 
efficiency, and restructuring and privatization of the large state monopolies.  While these 
                                                            
59 One of the difficulties in analyzing the direction of political discussions is that the actors are nearly constantly in 
motion, moving regularly from one ministerial appointment to another.  Thus, individuals in leadership positions at 
Samruk Kazyna and in the most important ministries may not be in place at the time actions are actually taken.   
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enterprises are to be privatized, the controlling interest will still be held by the state. It is hoped 
that the partial privatizations will lead to publicly traded shares that will then bring market 
pressures leading to an improvement in corporate governance and accountability.  In addition 
there is an ongoing rationalization of the structure of state holdings as various Samruk Kazyna 
holdings are transferred to other Ministries.  For example, the Damu Entrepreneurship 
Development Fund and the Distressed Assets Fund JSC were transferred to the Ministry of 
Economic Development and Trade:  The Kazakhstan Development Bank JSC, the Investment 
Fund of Kazakhstan JSC, Kazyna CapitalManagement JSC and KazExpoGarant Export and 
Credit Insurance Corporation were transferred to the Ministry of Trade and Industry; and the 
Kazakhstan Housing and Savings Bank, Kazakhstan Fund for Mortgage Guarantee and the 
Kazakhstan Mortgage Company were transferred to the Agency for Construction and Housing 
and Public Utilities Infrastructure.   
 Corporate governance issues of public firms are being taken more seriously by the 
government but firms held by Samruk Kazyna are lagging behind.  In a recent study of 
transparency and disclosure by Standard and Poor’s Governance Services division it is noted that 
transparency and disclosure standards are low, but gradually increasing.60 In a recent study the 
“Standard and Poor’s Kazakhstan Transparency Index” is calculated on the basis of 110 specific 
items, grouped into three categories: 1) ownership structure and share holder rights, 2) financial 
and operational information, and 3) board and management structure and process.   The overall 
score was 44% (out of 100%) for a sample of the 22 largest public firms (market capitalization of 
more than US$100 million) and 8 non-public firms. This compares to71% for the UK, 70% for 
the US (2003 survey), 58% for Russia and 46% for China (2008 survey).61  However, it is 
important to note that the average score for the sample of 8 firms held by Samruk Kazyna was 
25% , which is much lower than average.  The highest score for these 8 was for the Kazakhstan 
Development Bank, at 53%. One important factor for public firms that scored high was the fact 
that several were listed on the London Stock Exchange, which has higher disclosure requirements.  
No such pressures exists for the non-public firms held by Samruk Kazyna, or only to a limited 
degree for those firms with large minority publicly held positions, quasi-public firms, like Air 
Astana.62  
 While privatization (and certainly listings on the Kazakhstan Stock Exchange or foreign 
exchanges) will likely increase the efficiency and improve corporate governance of the firms 
there is an even larger problem. There is not a clear common direction for all of the firms in 
Samruk Kazyna.  Some are potentially highly profitable commercial operations, like Air Astana.  
Others, coming from Kazyna JSC are non-profit, non-commercial organizations that are directly 
or indirectly subsidized from the earnings of other companies.  As a result it is difficult to 
                                                            
60  Pastoukhova, et al. (2009) 
61   The initial score for Russia, from the 2003 survey, was 40%; less than this first measurement for Kazakhstan.  
62  Another important issue that was highlighted was the concentration of ownership:  19 of the 22 public firms have 
at least one block owner of 25% or more of the shares.  11 of the 22 are majority owned by one shareholder. 
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measure the efficiency and overall profitability of the organization. The non-commercial 
operations, and in some cases the commercial operations, have social objectives rather than profit 
maximization alone as part of their responsibilities.  In addition, Samruk Kazyna itself has been 
assigned social responsibilities, such as the complete financing of the recent Asian Games.  This 
clearly limits the profit potential and efficiency of individual units. In addition the lack of 
transparency of transactions within Samruk Kazyna makes it difficult to evaluate the performance 
of individual units or the overall performance of Samruk Kazyna itself.  This is slowly improving, 
as the ten to fifteen largest companies have annual reports available for several years and SK for 
the last three years. Further, to improve operations and increase overall efficiency of the 
development companies and entrepreneurship funds, all will be amalgamated and placed under 
the control of the Development Bank, itself recently transferred to the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry.  The performance of the Development Bank will then be an indicator of the 
effectiveness of these smaller funds.  These activities will likely take place in a timeframe of 5-10 
years. 
 The third goal deals with the anti-crisis activities of Samruk Kazyna. Samruk Kazyna was 
created on October 13, 2008 and it immediately focused on saving several failing banks.  These 
are now restructured and are operating more effectively. Samruk Kazyna’s immediate goal now is 
to exit this sphere of activity.  Similarly, support for residential housing and construction was 
initiated to prevent the collapse of that sector.  The Property Fund of SK continued the financing 
of construction and the properties are now on the market.  The financial crisis nonetheless had a 
devastating impact on these sectors, but a 23% increase in agriculture resulted in a 1% increase in 
overall GDP for the time period rather than significant negative growth. 
The importance of this third goal, effective anti-crisis measures, is expected to lessen over 
the next few years. While the future role of Samruk Kazyna in anti-crisis activities like those of 
2008-2009 is expected to be less important, the specifics of unwinding the bank bailout, re-
privatization via new IPOs, and the final disposition of the proceeds from the privatization are 
going be figured out over the next 2-3 years.63  Initially the proceeds of the re-privatization of the 
banks will be revenues for Samruk Kazyna and authorities at Samruk Kazyna argue that the next 
wave of privatization revenues should be retained by Samruk Kazyna for further economic 
development purposes.   
A recent concern is the overall indebtedness of Samruk Kazyna, the individual companies’ 
debts, the implicit guarantees of the government for Samruk Kazyna, which coupled with the lack 
of transparency and financing strategy, may threaten Kazakhstan’s sovereign debt ratings, if not 
lead to another financial crisis.  To address this, in June/July 2011 the first overall report on debt 
is expected to be released.  When Samruk Kazyna borrowings are added to other direct 
                                                            
63  The fiscal responsibility laws discussed in Ossoski, et al. (2008), like the “New Concept” governing the National 
Fund, do not apply to Samruk Kazyna, even though it is labeled the Sovereign Wealth Fund of Kazakhstan.  
However, many of the activities outlined in the Strategic Plan for 2020 are to be undertaken by organizations in 
Samruk Kazyna.  
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government borrowing it is unclear whether the level is sustainable or will affect the sovereign 
debt rankings of Kazakhstan.  What seems clear, however, is that the Kazakhstan government is 
taking international concerns about debt seriously. 
IV. Summary and Conclusions 
 The two sovereign wealth funds of Kazakhstan, the National Oil Fund and Samruk 
Kazyna, have had a major role in short term stabilization programs and long term development 
programs for the country.  The National Oil Fund has a well defined mission, has been relatively 
well managed, has been relatively transparent, and has played a critical role in the government’s 
response to the recent financial crisis. The “New Concept” for the Fund suggests that it will play a 
smaller role in the functioning of the economy now that the financial crisis has been resolved, and 
its “savings” function for intergenerational equity will expand. The government is clearly 
signaling that the Fund has two roles - stability and savings - and the stability role is reserved for 
one-time events like the financial crisis, not to be an ongoing continuing source of funding.  
Samruk Kazyna, with many more assets and income plays a larger role in the economy and has a 
larger role in terms of economic development.  The Strategic Plan for 2020 carefully defines the 
role of Samruk Kazyna as a major initiator of the economic development plan of the government. 
Whether this role expands, and Samruk Kazyna itself expands or whether it shrinks along with 
planned privatizations is a hotly debated issue and remains an open question. 
 The government appears serious in pushing Samruk Kazyna and its holdings to provide 
greater transparency and better corporate governance than in the past.  This is essential for 
planned privatizations and the participation of the international financial community.  Data is 
slowly becoming available and more detailed analyses of individual companies and Samruk 
Kazyna itself is now possible.  Given the role of both the National Oil Fund and Samruk Kazyna 
in the Kazakhstan economy more serious attention should be paid to the activities of both. 
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VIII. Appendix:  Figures and Tables to be inserted in the text.  
 All figures and associated tables for Kazakhstan are author’s calculations. 
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Table 1: Largest Sovereign Wealth Funds 
(c. 2008, US $'s Billions) 
         
Country  Fund 
Assets in 
US$ Billion 
Foreign 
Investment 
Equity 
Investment 
Oil Exporting countries  Total  1240‐2220       
United Arab Emirates   Abu Dhabi Investment Council     400‐800     high     high   
 Norway     Government Pension Fund ‐ Global    373   high     medium   
 Saudi Arabia     SAMA    300   high     low   
 Kuwait     Kuwait Investment Authority    213   high     high   
 UAE     Investment Corporation of Dubai     20‐80     high     high   
 Qatar     Qatar Investment Authority     20‐60     high     high   
 Libya     Libya Investment Authority     20‐60     high     high   
 Brunei     Brunei Investment Agency    10‐50   high     high   
 Norway     Government Pension Fund ‐ Norway    20   low     medium   
 Russia     Future Generations Fund    24   high     high   
 Kazakhstan     National Oil Fund    22   high     low   
 Malaysia     Khazanah Nasional Berhad    18   low     high   
         
East Asia  Total  585       
 China     China Investment Corporation    200   high     high   
 Singapore     Government Investment Company    130   high     high   
 Hong Kong     Exchange Fund Investment Portfolio    112   high     low   
 Singapore     Temasek Holdings    108   medium     high   
 Korea     Korea Investment Corporation    20   high     high   
 Taiwan     National Stabilisation Fund    15   low     high   
         
Others  Total  138       
 Australia     Government Future Fund    49   medium     medium   
 United States     Alaska Permanent Fund    38   medium     medium   
 United States     Permanent University Fund  20  medium  medium 
 United States   New Mexico State Investment    16  medium  medium 
 Canada     Alberta Heritage    15   medium     medium   
Grand Total     1963‐2943       
 
 
Source: Beck and Fidora (2008), Table 1      
Notes: Figures are only rough approximations. “High” and “low” refer to shares above two-thirds  
and below one-third, respectively      
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Table 2: SWF's major cross-border equity investments 
2007-2008 Q1 
       
Sovereign Wealth Fund  Acquired Companies 
Transaction 
Value    
      (In US$ Billions) 
(In % of firm 
value) 
GIC of Singapore   UBS     9.8     8.6   
 Abu Dhabi Investment Council     Citigroup     7.6     4.9   
 GIC of Singapore     Citigroup     6.9     4.4   
 Investment Corporation of Dubai     MGM Mirage     5.1     9.5   
 China Investment Company     Morgan Stanley     5.0     9.9   
 Temasek (Singapore)     Merril Lynch     5.0     11.3   
 Qatar Investment Authority     Sainsbury     3.7     25.0   
 KIA (Kuwait)     Merril Lynch     3.4     7.0   
 China Development Bank     Barclays     3.0     3.1   
 China Investment Company     Blackstone     3.0     10.0   
 Investment Corporation of Dubai     London Stock Exchange     3.0     28.0   
 Temasek (Singapore)     China Eastern Air     2.8     8.3   
 SAFE (China)     Total     2.8     1.6   
 SAFE (China)     British Petroleum     2.0     1.0   
 KIC (Korea)     Merril Lynch     2.0     4.3   
 Temasek (Singapore)     Barclays     2.0     1.8   
 Qatar Investment Authority     London Stock Exchange     2.0     20.0   
 Temasek (Singapore)     Standard Chartered     2.0     5.4   
 undisclosed “Middle East investor”     UBS     1.8     1.6   
 Abu Dhabi Investment Council     Carlyle Group     1.4     7.5   
 Investment Corporation of Dubai     Och‐Ziff Capital Management     1.3     9.9   
 Investment Corporation of Dubai     Mauser Group     1.2     100.0   
 Investment Corporation of Dubai     Alliance Medical     1.2     100.0   
 GIC of Singapore     Myer Melbourne     1.0     100.0   
 China Citic Securities     Bear Stearns     1.0     6.0   
 Borse Dubai     Nasdaq     1.0     19.9   
 Investment Corporation of Dubai     Standard Chartered     1.0     2.7   
 Investment Corporation of Dubai     Almatis     1.0     100.0   
 GIC of Singapore     Merrill Lynch Financial Centre     1.0     100.0   
 Investment Corporation of Dubai     Barney's New York     0.9     100.0   
 Investment Corporation of Dubai     EADS     0.8     3.1   
 GIC of Singapore     Hawks Town     0.8     100.0   
 Investment Corporation of Dubai     ICICI Bank Ltd     0.8     2.9   
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 Temasek (Singapore)     Tokyo Westin     0.7     100.0   
 Mubadala Development Comp. 
(UAE)     Advanced Micro Devices     0.6     8.0   
 GIC of Singapore     WestQuay Shopping Centre     0.6     50.0   
 Investment Corporation of Dubai     Sony     0.5     1.0   
 Qatar Investment Authority     OMX     0.5     10.0   
 GIC of Singapore     British Land     0.3     3.0   
 Investment Corporation of Dubai     Metropole Hotel     0.3     100.0   
 GIC of Singapore     Kungshuset     0.2     100.0   
 SAFE (China)     Commonwealth Bank of Australia     0.2     0.3   
 SAFE (China)   
 Australia and New Zealand Banking 
Group     0.2     0.3   
 SAFE (China)     National Australia Bank     0.2     0.3   
 GIC of Singapore     Roma Est Shopping Centre     0.1     50.0   
 Temasek (Singapore)     9You Online Games     0.1     9.4   
Total     91.5    
 
 
Source: Beck and Fidora (2008)       
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Table 3a: Sovereign Wealth Funds: L­M Transparency Index and the Truman Score 
Country  Fund Name 
Asset 
holdings (in 
Billions of 
USD) 
Linaburg­
Maduell 
Transparency 
Index 
Truman 
Score 
UAE – Abu Dhabi  Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 627.0 3  11
Norway  Government Pension Fund – Global 571.5 10  97
China  SAFE Investment Company 567.9 2 
Saudi Arabia  SAMA Foreign Holdings 472.5 2 
China  China Investment Corporation 409.6 7  57
Kuwait  Kuwait Investment Authority 296.0 6  63
China – Hong Kong  Hong Kong Monetary Authority Investment Portfolio  292.3  8 
Singapore  Government of Singapore Investment Corporation 247.5 6  65
Singapore  Temasek Holdings  157.2 10  73
China  National Social Security Fund 146.5 5  70
Russia  National Welfare Fund 142.5 5 
Qatar  Qatar Investment Authority 85.0 5  15
Australia  Australian Future Fund 72.9 10  80
Libya  Libyan Investment Authority 70.0 2 
UAE – Abu Dhabi  International Petroleum Investment Company 58.0 n/a  26
Algeria  Revenue Regulation Fund 56.7 1  29
US – Alaska  Alaska Permanent Fund 40.3 10  92
Kazakhstan  Kazakhstan National Fund 38.6 6  65
South Korea  Korea Investment Corporation 37.0 9  60
Malaysia  Khazanah Nasional  36.8 4  44
Azerbaijan  State Oil Fund  30.2 10  76
Ireland  National Pensions Reserve Fund 30.0 10  86
Brunei  Brunei Investment Agency 30.0 1  23
France  Strategic Investment Fund 28.0 n/a  89
US ‐ Texas  Texas Permanent School Fund 24.4 n/a 
Iran  Oil Stabilisation Fund  23.0 1  29
Chile  Social and Economic Stabilization Fund 21.8 10  71
UAE – Abu Dhabi  Investment Corporation of Dubai 19.6 4  55
New Zealand  New Zealand Superannuation Fund 15.6 10  94
Canada  Alberta's Heritage Fund 15.1 9  74
US ‐ New Mexico  New Mexico State Investment Council 14.3 9  80
UAE – Abu Dhabi  Mubadala Development Company 13.3 10  59
Brazil  Sovereign Fund of Brazil 11.3 new 
Bahrain  Mumtalakat Holding Company 9.1 9  30
Oman  State General Reserve Fund 8.2 1  23
Botswana  Pula Fund  6.9 6  56
East Timor  Timor‐Leste Petroleum Fund 6.3 6  85
Mexico  Oil Revenues Stabilization Fund of Mexico 6.0 n/a  44
Saudi Arabia  Public Investment Fund 5.3 3 
China  China‐Africa Development Fund 5.0 4 
US ‐ Wyoming  Permanent Wyoming Mineral Trust Fund 4.7 9  91
Trinidad & Tobago  Heritage and Stabilization Fund 2.9 8  83
Italy  Italian Strategic Fund  1.4 n/a 
UAE ‐ Ras Al Khaimah  RAK Investment Authority 1.2 3 
Nigeria  Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority 1.0 n/a 
Venezuela  FEM  0.8 1 
Vietnam  State Capital Investment Corporation 0.5 4  35
Kiribati  Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund 0.4 1  35
Indonesia  Government Investment Unit 0.3 new 
Mauritania  National Fund for Hydrocarbon Reserves 0.3 1 
UAE ‐ Federal  Emirates Investment Authority n/a 2 
Oman  Oman Investment Fund n/a new 
UAE – Abu Dhabi  Abu Dhabi Investment Council n/a new 
  Total Oil & Gas Related 2,645.7  
  Total Other  2,117.0  
  TOTAL  4,762.7  
  Average SWF  95.3 5.7  59.0
Source: http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund‐rankings/ and Truman (2010, Table 5.1)
Updated October 2011 
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Table 3b: Sovereign Wealth  Funds as a Share of the World’s  30 Largest Stock Markets 
 
Country Name 
Stock  Market 
Capitalization: 5­yr avg (In 
Billions of USD) 
Abu  Dhabi 
% of total 
Kazakh NFK 
% of total 
10 Largest SWF 
Average size % 
of total 
World  257,731.412  0.243%  0.015%  0.147% 
United States  83,327.048  0.752%  0.046%  0.455% 
European Union  57,087.018  1.098%  0.068%  0.664% 
China  21,216.727  2.955%  0.182%  1.785% 
Japan  19,877.712  3.154%  0.194%  1.906% 
United Kingdom  15,408.251  4.069%  0.251%  2.458% 
France  10,590.645  5.920%  0.364%  3.577% 
Canada  8,730.660  7.182%  0.442%  4.339% 
Hong Kong SAR, China  8,389.564  7.474%  0.460%  4.515% 
Germany  7,578.563  8.273%  0.509%  4.998% 
Spain  6,538.142  9.590%  0.590%  5.794% 
India  6,078.552  10.315%  0.635%  6.232% 
Australia  5,782.908  10.842%  0.667%  6.550% 
Switzerland  5,649.737  11.098%  0.683%  6.705% 
Brazil  5,383.761  11.646%  0.717%  7.036% 
South Africa  3,757.215  16.688%  1.027%  10.082% 
Netherlands  3,327.757  18.842%  1.160%  11.383% 
Italy  3,255.643  19.259%  1.186%  11.635% 
Sweden  2,451.760  25.573%  1.574%  15.450% 
Mexico  1,773.561  35.353%  2.176%  21.358% 
Saudi Arabia  1,760.496  35.615%  2.193%  21.517% 
Singapore  1,490.696  42.061%  2.589%  25.411% 
Belgium  1,480.799  42.342%  2.607%  25.581% 
Malaysia  1,414.571  44.324%  2.729%  26.778% 
Norway  1,242.576  50.460%  3.106%  30.485% 
Turkey  1,099.298  57.036%  3.511%  34.458% 
Chile  1,070.954  58.546%  3.604%  35.370% 
Denmark  1,058.885  59.213%  3.645%  35.773% 
Finland  998.193  62.814%  3.867%  37.949% 
Indonesia  987.919  63.467%  3.907%  38.343% 
Source: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD/countries?display=default   
Updated November 23, 2011       
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Table 3c: Sovereign Wealth Funds as a Share of Domestic Debt Securities by Sector and Residence of Issuer (Total Debt) 
Country 
Total 
(In Billions 
of USD) 
Government 
(In Billions of 
USD) 
Financial 
Institutions 
(In Billions of 
USD) 
Corporate 
(In 
Billions of 
USD) 
Abu Dhabi 
% of total 
Kazakh 
NOF 
% of total 
10 Largest 
SWF Average 
size 
% of total 
All issuers  68,716.7  40,015.5  21,822.8 6,878.5 0.91% 0.06%  0.55%
Argentina  60.4  51.3  2.8  6.4  1038.08%  63.91%  627.15% 
Australia  1,084.9  369.7  669.3 45.9 57.79% 3.56%  34.92%
Austria  383.1  145.1  191.9 46.1 163.66% 10.08%  98.88%
Belgium  575.8  301.0  250.0 24.8 108.89% 6.70%  65.79%
Brazil  1,527.7  983.1  534.2 10.4 41.04% 2.53%  24.80%
Canada  1,534.7  1,068.5  288.4 177.8 40.85% 2.52%  24.68%
China  3,047.7  1,500.8  974.6 572.2 20.57% 1.27%  12.43%
Czech Republic  87.6  59.9  17.7 10.0 715.75% 44.06%  432.42%
Denmark  613.2  106.4  505.4 1.4 102.25% 6.29%  61.77%
Finland  88.5  26.2  45.0 13.3 708.47% 43.62%  428.02%
France  3,421.5  1,834.0  1,300.6 286.9 18.33% 1.13%  11.07%
Germany  2,814.6  1,817.7  593.6 403.3 22.28% 1.37%  13.46%
Greece  275.0  164.7  110.2 0.1 228.00% 14.04%  137.75%
Hong Kong SAR  64.7  30.2  24.6  10.0  969.09%  59.66%  585.47% 
India  711.1  610.4  75.5 25.1 88.17% 5.43%  53.27%
Indonesia  96.7  84.4  5.7 6.7 648.40% 39.92%  391.73%
Ireland  344.6  65.4  276.4 2.8 181.95% 11.20%  109.92%
Italy  3,236.4  2,094.2  761.7 380.5 19.37% 1.19%  11.70%
Japan  13,575.1  11,579.9  1,127.5 867.7 4.62% 0.28%  2.79%
Malaysia  277.8  131.3  59.8 86.7 225.70% 13.89%  136.36%
Mexico  451.2  261.1  152.2 38.0 138.96% 8.55%  83.95%
Netherlands  1,048.6  416.7  507.0 124.9 59.79% 3.68%  36.12%
Norway  259.6  101.2  129.5 28.8 241.53% 14.87%  145.92%
Poland  230.1  220.5  9.7 0.0 272.49% 16.78%  164.62%
Portugal  275.9  104.5  119.3 52.1 227.26% 13.99%  137.30%
Singapore  130.7  105.5  23.2  2.0  479.72%  29.53%  289.82% 
South Africa  185.6  122.6  35.1 27.9 337.82% 20.80%  204.09%
South Korea  1,175.0  512.8  257.7 404.6 53.36% 3.29%  32.24%
Spain  1,576.1  707.0  844.8 24.2 39.78% 2.45%  24.03%
Sweden  444.9  136.0  273.2 35.7 140.93% 8.68%  85.14%
Switzerland  292.1  126.9  135.2 30.1 214.65% 13.21%  129.68%
Thailand  228.1  164.9  3.2 60.1 274.88% 16.92%  166.07%
Turkey  232.5  229.4  0.0 3.1 269.68% 16.60%  162.92%
United Kingdom  1,727.1  1,394.8  311.6 20.7 36.30% 2.23%  21.93%
United States  25,475.3  11,403.4  11,134.7 2,937.2 2.46% 0.15%  1.49%
Source: http://www.bis.org/statistics/secstats.htm 
(Table 16A) Updated March 2011   
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Table 3d: Sovereign Wealth Funds as a Share of Domestic Debt Securities by Sector and Residence of Issuer (Debt 
Issued by Corporations) 
Country 
Total 
 (In Billions of USD) 
Corporate 
(In Billions of 
USD) 
Abu Dhabi 
% of total 
Kazakh NOF 
% of total 
10 Largest SWF 
Average size % 
of total 
All issuers 68,716.7 6,878.5 9.12% 0.56% 5.51% 
Argentina 60.4 6.4 9796.88% 603.13% 5918.75% 
Australia 1,084.9 45.9 1366.01% 84.10% 825.27% 
Austria 383.1 46.1 1360.09% 83.73% 821.69% 
Belgium 575.8 24.8 2528.23% 155.65% 1527.42% 
Brazil 1,527.7 10.4 6028.85% 371.15% 3642.31% 
Canada 1,534.7 177.8 352.64% 21.71% 213.05% 
China 3,047.7 572.2 109.58% 6.75% 66.20% 
Czech Republic 87.6 10.0 6270.00% 386.00% 3788.00% 
Denmark 613.2 1.4 44785.71% 2757.14% 27057.14% 
Finland 88.5 13.3 4714.29% 290.23% 2848.12% 
France 3,421.5 286.9 218.54% 13.45% 132.03% 
Germany 2,814.6 403.3 155.47% 9.57% 93.93% 
Greece 275.0 0.1 627000.00% 38600.00% 378800.00% 
Hong Kong SAR 64.7 10.0 6270.00% 386.00% 3788.00% 
India 711.1 25.1 2498.01% 153.78% 1509.16% 
Indonesia 96.7 6.7 9358.21% 576.12% 5653.73% 
Ireland 344.6 2.8 22392.86% 1378.57% 13528.57% 
Italy 3,236.4 380.5 164.78% 10.14% 99.55% 
Japan 13,575.1 867.7 72.26% 4.45% 43.66% 
Malaysia 277.8 86.7 723.18% 44.52% 436.91% 
Mexico 451.2 38.0 1650.00% 101.58% 996.84% 
Netherlands 1,048.6 124.9 502.00% 30.90% 303.28% 
Norway 259.6 28.8 2177.08% 134.03% 1315.28% 
Poland 230.1 0.0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Portugal 275.9 52.1 1203.45% 74.09% 727.06% 
Singapore 130.7 2.0 31350.00% 1930.00% 18940.00% 
South Africa 185.6 27.9 2247.31% 138.35% 1357.71% 
South Korea 1,175.0 404.6 154.97% 9.54% 93.62% 
Spain 1,576.1 24.2 2590.91% 159.50% 1565.29% 
Sweden 444.9 35.7 1756.30% 108.12% 1061.06% 
Switzerland 292.1 30.1 2083.06% 128.24% 1258.47% 
Thailand 228.1 60.1 1043.26% 64.23% 630.28% 
Turkey 232.5 3.1 20225.81% 1245.16% 12219.35% 
United Kingdom 1,727.1 20.7 3028.99% 186.47% 1829.95% 
United States 25,475.3 2,937.2 21.35% 1.31% 12.90% 
      
Source: http://www.bis.org/statistics/secstats.htm 
(Table 16B) Updated March 2011 
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Table 4: Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (GAPP)—Santiago Principles, IWG 
(2008) 
 
 In furtherance of the “Objective and Purpose,” the IWG members either have 
implemented or intend to implement the following principles and practices, on a voluntary basis, 
each of which is subject to home country laws, regulations, requirements and obligations. This 
paragraph is an integral part of the GAPP. 
 
GAPP 1. Principle 
The legal framework for the SWF should be sound and support its effective operation and the 
achievement of its stated objective(s). 
 GAPP 1.1. Subprinciple. The legal framework for the SWF should ensure legal 
 soundness of the SWF and its transactions. 
 GAPP 1.2. Subprinciple. The key features of the SWF’s legal basis and structure, as well 
 as the legal relationship between the SWF and other state bodies, should be publicly 
 disclosed. 
 
GAPP 2. Principle 
The policy purpose of the SWF should be clearly defined and publicly disclosed. 
 
GAPP 3. Principle 
Where the SWF’s activities have significant direct domestic macroeconomic implications, those 
activities should be closely coordinated with the domestic fiscal and monetary authorities, so as to 
ensure consistency with the overall macroeconomic policies. 
 
GAPP 4. Principle 
There should be clear and publicly disclosed policies, rules, procedures, or arrangements in 
relation to the SWF’s general approach to funding, withdrawal, and spending operations. 
  GAPP 4.1. Subprinciple. The source of SWF funding should be publicly disclosed. 
 GAPP 4.2. Subprinciple. The general approach to withdrawals from the SWF and 
 spending on behalf of the government should be publicly disclosed. 
 
GAPP 5. Principle 
The relevant statistical data pertaining to the SWF should be reported on a timely basis to 
the owner, or as otherwise required, for inclusion where appropriate in macroeconomic data sets. 
 
GAPP 6. Principle 
The governance framework for the SWF should be sound and establish a clear and effective 
division of roles and responsibilities in order to facilitate accountability and operational 
independence in the management of the SWF to pursue its objectives. 
 
GAPP 7. Principle 
The owner should set the objectives of the SWF, appoint the members of its governing body(ies) 
in accordance with clearly defined procedures, and exercise oversight over the SWF’s operations. 
 
GAPP 8. Principle 
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The governing body(ies) should act in the best interests of the SWF, and have a clear mandate and 
adequate authority and competency to carry out its functions.  
 
GAPP 9. Principle 
The operational management of the SWF should implement the SWF’s strategies in an PART I 
independent manner and in accordance with clearly defined responsibilities. 
 
GAPP 10. Principle 
The accountability framework for the SWF’s operations should be clearly defined in the relevant 
legislation, charter, other constitutive documents, or management agreement. 
 
GAPP 11. Principle  
An annual report and accompanying financial statements on the SWF’s operations and 
performance should be prepared in a timely fashion and in accordance with recognized 
international or national accounting standards in a consistent manner. 
 
GAPP 12. Principle 
The SWF’s operations and financial statements should be audited annually in accordance with 
recognized international or national auditing standards in a consistent manner. 
 
GAPP 13. Principle 
Professional and ethical standards should be clearly defined and made known to the members of 
the SWF’s governing body(ies), management, and staff. 
 
GAPP 14. Principle 
Dealing with third parties for the purpose of the SWF’s operational management should be based 
on economic and financial grounds, and follow clear rules and procedures. 
 
GAPP 15. Principle 
SWF operations and activities in host countries should be conducted in compliance with all 
applicable regulatory and disclosure requirements of the countries in which they operate. 
 
GAPP 16. Principle 
The governance framework and objectives, as well as the manner in which the SWF’s 
management is operationally independent from the owner, should be publicly disclosed. 
 
GAPP 17. Principle 
Relevant financial information regarding the SWF should be publicly disclosed to demonstrate its 
economic and financial orientation, so as to contribute to stability in international financial 
markets and enhance trust in recipient countries. 
 
GAPP 18. Principle 
The SWF’s investment policy should be clear and consistent with its defined objectives, risk 
tolerance, and investment strategy, as set by the owner or the governing body(ies), and be based 
on sound portfolio management principles. 
 GAPP 18.1. Subprinciple. The investment policy should guide the SWF’s financial risk 
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 exposures and the possible use of leverage. 
 GAPP 18.2. Subprinciple. The investment policy should address the extent to which 
 internal and/or external investment managers are used, the range of their activities and 
 authority, and the process by which they are selected and their performance monitored. 
 GAPP 18.3. Subprinciple. A description of the investment policy of the SWF should be 
 publicly disclosed. 
 
GAPP 19. Principle 
The SWF’s investment decisions should aim to maximize risk-adjusted financial returns in a 
manner consistent with its investment policy, and based on economic and financial grounds. 
 GAPP 19.1. Subprinciple. If investment decisions are subject to other than economic 
 and financial considerations, these should be clearly set out in the investment policy and 
 be publicly disclosed. 
 GAPP 19.2. Subprinciple. The management of an SWF’s assets should be consistent with 
 what is generally accepted as sound asset management principles. 
 
GAPP 20. Principle 
The SWF should not seek or take advantage of privileged information or inappropriate influence 
by the broader government in competing with private entities. 
SANTIAGO PRINCIPL9 
GAPP 21. Principle 
SWFs view shareholder ownership rights as a fundamental element of their equity investments’ 
value. If an SWF chooses to exercise its ownership rights, it should do so in a manner that is 
consistent with its investment policy and protects the financial value of its investments. The  SWF 
should publicly disclose its general approach to voting securities of listed entities,  including the 
key factors guiding its exercise of ownership rights. 
 
GAPP 22. Principle 
The SWF should have a framework that identifies, assesses, and manages the risks of its 
operations. 
 GAPP 22.1. Subprinciple. The risk management framework should include reliable 
 information and timely reporting systems, which should enable the adequate monitoring 
 and management of relevant risks within acceptable parameters and levels, control and 
 incentive mechanisms, codes of conduct, business continuity planning, and an 
 independent audit function.  
 GAPP 22.2. Subprinciple. The general approach to the SWF’s risk management 
 framework should be publicly disclosed. 
 
GAPP 23. Principle 
The assets and investment performance (absolute and relative to benchmarks, if any) of the SWF 
should be measured and reported to the owner according to clearly defined principles or 
standards. 
 
GAPP 24. Principle 
A process of regular review of the implementation of the GAPP should be engaged in by or on 
behalf of the SWF.
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Table 5: Management Council of the National Oil Fund 
 
  1.  The President of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
  2.  The Prime-Minister 
  3.  The Chairman of the Senate of the Parliament 
  4.  The Chairman of the  Mazhilis (Lower Chamber) of the Parliament 
  5.  Head of the Administration of the President 
  6.  Governor of the National Bank 
  7.  The First Deputy of the Prime-Minister 
  8.  Chairman of the Accounting Committee 
  9.  The Minister of Finance 
10.  The Minister of Economy and Budget Planning 
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Table 6: Largest Organizations of Samruk Kazyna  
    Доля 
1 АО "Казмунайгаз" 100% 
2 АО «ҚАЗАҚСТАН ТЕМІР ЖОЛЫ» 100% 
3 АО "KEGOC" 100% 
4 АО "Казахтелеком" 45,90% 
5 АО "Казпочта" 100% 
6 АО "Эйр Астана" 51% 
7 АО "Национальная морская судоходная компания "Казмортрансфлот" 50% 
8 АО "Самрук-Энерго" 93,42% 
9 АО "Казахский научно-исследовательский институт энергетики имени академика Ш.Ч. Чокина" 50% 
10 АО "Казахстанский оператор рынка электрической энергии и мощности" 100% 
11 АО "Аэропорт Павлодар" 100% 
12 АО "Международный аэропорт Актобе" 100% 
13 ТОО "Ремонтная корпорация "Камкор" 100% 
14 ТОО "Самрук Инвест" 100% 
15 ТОО "Телеком Самрук Инвест" 100% 
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16 АО "Банк развития Казахстана" 100% 
17 АО "Kazyna Capital Management" 100% 
18 АО "Фонд развития предпринимательства "Даму" 100% 
19 АО "Национальный инновационный фонд" 100% 
20 АО "Государственная страховая корпорация по страхованию экспортных кредитов и инвестиций" 100% 
21 АО "Инвестиционный фонд Казахстана" 100% 
22 АО "Корпорация по развитию и продвижению экспорта "Kaznex" 100% 
23 АО "Центр инжиниринга и трансферта технологий" Дов.управление
24 АО "Астана-Финанс" 26% 
25 АО "Казахстанская ипотечная компания" 91% 
26 АО "Казахстанский фонд гарантирования ипотечных кредитов" 89% 
27 АО "Жилищный строительный сберегательный банк Казахстана" 100% 
28 АО "Майкаинзолото" 25% 
29 АО "Казатомпром" 100% 
30 «Каzаkhmys РLС» (Великобритания) 14,99% 
31 «Еurаsiаn Nаtural Resоurces Cоrpоrаtion РLС» (Великобритания) 11,65% 
32 Joint Stock Company «Real estate fund «Samruk-Kazyna»  
33 «United chemical company» Limited Liability Partnership 100% 
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34 «SK-Pharmaceuticals» Limited Liability Partnership 100% 
35 joint-stock company «Tau-Ken Samruk» National Mining Company 100% 
36 “D.V. Sokolsky Institute for Organic Catalysis and Electrochemistry" JSC  100% 
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Table 7:  Members of the Boards of Directors of Major Companies of Samruk Kazyna 
  On umdrive and available upon request. 
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Fund’s Assets at the End of the Reporting Period, Total in Millions USD
Y2005  Y2006  Y2007  Y2008  Y2009  Y2010  1‐Apr‐11
8,061.1  14,190.4  22,809.9 27,114.8 30,789.4 38,622.5  41,675.2
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Uses of Funds by the End of the Reporting Period, Total in Millions USD 
  Y2005  Y2006  Y2007  Y2008  Y2009  Y2010  1‐Apr‐11 
Uses of Funds, Total  5.5  7.3  2,116.6  8,934.6  7,506.2  8,170.6  1,025.7 
 Including:               
Guaranteed Transfers  0  0  2,105.9  3,863.7  5,714.2  8,143.6  1,024.6 
Targeted Transfers  0  0  0  5,048.6  1,772.4  0  0 
Mgt and External Audit Expenses  5.5  7.3  10.8  22.2  19.6  27.0  1.1 
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Fund Receipts by Major Category in Millions USD 
   Y2005  Y2006  Y2007  Y2008  Y2009  Y2010  1‐Apr‐11 
Receipts, Total  3,047.0  5,627.9  9,798.6  15,233.7  15,856.3  16,250.0  3,735.4 
Including:               
Budget Transfers I  2,578.4  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Direct Taxes  0  5,333.1  8,472.0  14,131.8  9,294.6  15,312.3  3,731.6 
Other Oil Sector Receipts  0  0  0  138.6  41.2  113.2  2.7 
From Privatization  73.7  99.7  0.0  0  0.0  0  0 
From Sales of Land  16.3  31.5  44.1  13.4  4.4  3.6  1.1 
Investment Income  268.2  79.3  1,282.5  949.9  6,516.0  821.0  0 
Budget Transfers II  102.8  84.2  0  0  0.0  0  0 
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Receipts and Uses of Funds, Total in Millions of USD 
  Y2005  Y2006 Y2007 Y2008  Y2009  Y2010  1‐Apr‐11 
Receipts  3,047  5,628  9,799  15,234 15,856 16,250  3,735 
Uses of Funds  5  7  2,117  8,935  7,506  8,171  1,026 
 
61 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
62 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
 
 
63 
 
 
   Figure 7: Organizational Structure of Samruk Kazyna              
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